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ABSTRACT 
 
Title of Dissertation:  Prevention and Combat of a Spillage after Ghana’s  
Oil and Gas Discovery – Is Ghana Ready to face an  
Environmental Threat? 
 
Degree:   MSc 
 
The lacuna in international law to regulate the exploitation of crude oil brings into 
sharp focus the need for exploiting regimes to enact laws and establish measures and 
procedures to prevent and/or combat a spillage during exploitation activities, in order 
to forestall the grave damage the product can cause to the environment in the event 
of a spill.  Nation states which exploit crude oil have variously enacted laws to protect 
their environment, but these appear to be woefully inadequate as the laws have 
invariably held the exploitation companies liable for preventing accidents, and for 
combating any spill in order to prevent environmental damage. 
 
Ghana, in 2007, struck oil in commercial quantities, and began commercial 
exploitation in 2010.  Being a relatively new entrant on the oil extraction scene, it is 
evident that there was not much regulation to protect the environment from 
extraction activities, and the nation had to contend with regulating the industry after 
commercial production had commenced.  Again, there was a deficit in laid down 
procedures to prevent and/or mitigate the effects of a spill should it occur during 
exploitation.  The Deepwater Horizon incident in the Gulf of Mexico re-focused 
attention on the need to regulate the exploitation industry, to curtail the unbridled 
influence of the extraction companies in the provision of measures to combat an 
accidental spill at the drill sites. 
 
As a new entrant on the extraction scene, Ghana also did not have procedures in 
place to streamline the efforts of agencies who would be called upon to help 
combat a spill should it occur, and a compensation regime for damage due to a spill 
is also virtually non-existent.  Lines of authority and responsibility for the regulatory 
agencies are not clear-cut, leading to confusion on who to take charge of combating 
a spill, and how to go about compensating those affected by a spill. 
 
This dissertation looks at the preparations so far towards addressing these 
identified shortcomings, and attempts to proffer suggestions to enhance the 
effectiveness of these preparations, as well as other measures that need to be put in 
place to protect Ghana’s marine environment from the debilitating effects of a spillage 
of oil due to exploitation activities. 
 
Due to the very nature of the research, the population for this research was selected 
from institutions which are actively involved in regulating and exploiting the oil, 
and those servicing these institutions, as well as responsible institutions for providing 
security in Ghana’s maritime domain. 
 
The researcher attempts to answer the question of whether Ghana is ready to join the 
ranks of oil exploitation countries, specifically considering her preparedness to 
combat environmental damage due to an oil spill as a result of exploitation activities. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
 
 
1.0 INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Background to the Research 
Crude oil originates from ancient fossilised materials having been converted into oil 
over millions of years through geochemical processes.  It is found in the subsoil of the 
earth and oceans, and drilled in unrefined form, to be processed into petroleum 
products for use.  Crude oil is useful for various industries, and its products are utilised 
for both domestic and industrial use.  However, due to the very nature of the formation 
of crude oil, it is exploited from pressurised fields, and unregulated discharge or 
spillage of crude oil can have dire consequences for the environment into which it is 
spilled. 
 
Exploration for oil and its exploitation on the African continent began many years ago, 
and consequently, spillages of oil into the environment, both marine and terrestrial, is 
no new occurrence.  Nigeria, the largest oil exporter in Africa and the 8th largest in the 
world (Workman, 2017), is Ghana’s closest neighbour in English speaking West 
Africa, and has been exploiting oil for over half a century.  They have had their fair 
share (or perhaps more than their fair share) of spillages, some due to accidents, 
many due to sabotage and ineffective maintenance of equipment, including pipelines.  
Nigeria is thus a test tube case for Ghana in her quest to regulate the new oil and gas 
exploitation industry, and to seek to prevent an environmental disaster from 
happening. 
 
Ghana began commercial exploration for oil in the 1950’s with the establishment of 
the Ghana National Petroleum Corporation (GNPC), but it was only in 2007 that oil 
was found in commercial quantities by Kosmos Energy and their partners, in an area 
offshore Ghana’s west Cape Three Points, dubbed the Jubilee Field, in Ghana’s 
geophysical Tano basin block.  Initial exploration in the East Cape Three Points basin 
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encountered non-commercial hydrocarbon shows (Tippee, 1999).  Commercial 
exploitation of oil in Ghana began in December 2010. 
 
1.2 Statement of the Problem 
“The discovery of oil in Ghana in commercial quantities in 2007 and the 
commencement of production in 2010 is expected to have a positive impact on 
the economy.  On the other hand, the discovery raises a number of crucial and 
critical questions regarding the extent to which relevant policies, regulatory and 
monitoring mechanisms, and, particularly, environmental measures have been 
put in place to effectively respond to any eventual oil disaster” (Otoo, 2012). 
 
The GNPC, in executing its mandate of developing a national petroleum service 
industry, and in a bid to derive maximum benefit for the people of Ghana, embarked 
on accelerated promotion of the country’s hydrocarbon potential from the mid 1990’s, 
with the involvement of international partners, including Tullow Ghana Ltd, Kosmos 
Ghana H C, Anadarko W C T P Co, Sabre Oil and Gas, and the E O Group.  Tullow 
Ghana was designated Unit Operator under a Unitisation and Unit Operating 
Agreement with the Ministry of Energy, and the project design and execution was led 
by Kosmos Ghana as the Technical Operator (Irvin, de Jong and Armah, 2009).  In 
2007, the partners found oil in commercial quantities in the West Cape three Points 
and Deepwater Tano blocks, and commercial production of Ghana’s oil began in 
December 2010.  The oil blocks, located 60 km from the nearest coast, was christened 
the Jubilee Field (Irvin, de Jong and Armah, 2009).  Phase one of the exploitation of 
the oil comprised the completion of 17 wells, made up of 9 production wells, 6 water 
and 2 gas injection wells to re-inject water and gas back into the reservoir for pressure 
maintenance and enhancing oil recovery (Irvin, de Jong and Armah, 2009) (see Fig 
1). 
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Figure 1: Drill Centre Locations and Associated Flow Lines, Injection Lines and Umbilicals  
 
Due to the fact that the oil is being drilled offshore, any accident which causes a 
spillage can have disastrous effects, as evidenced in the Deepwater Horizon incident 
in the Gulf of Mexico in April 2010, and it is imperative that the country guards against 
such an occurrence.  In fact, upon the commencement of commercial drilling of oil in 
Ghana, “just as the events in the Gulf Coast unfolded, reports had it that KOSMOS, 
the company exploring oil in Ghana’s Jubilee Field, has spilled 699 barrels of (drill) 
mud which contains poisonous heavy metals on three occasions that could affect 
Ghana’s ecosystem” (Egbefome, 2011). 
 
The International Maritime Organisation (IMO), the international body vested with the 
mandate of ensuring the safety and security of shipping and preventing marine 
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pollution, has adopted various conventions, codes and protocols in executing its 
mandate.  However, there is no international regulation specifically protecting the 
marine environment with regards to exploitation activities, as almost all the 
conventions, codes and protocols lay emphasis on maritime transportation.  It is thus 
left to individual countries to protect their marine environments when it comes to 
exploitation of marine resources.  With offshore exploitation being so capital intensive, 
most oil producing nations in Africa are rather “soft” on such regulations as they do 
not have the wherewithal to engage in exploitation themselves, leading to various 
pollution incidents with little or no sanctions for the polluting companies, and little 
efforts to stem the tide. 
 
In Nigeria, “on May 1, 2010, a raptured Exxon Mobil pipeline in Akwa Ibom state 
spilled more than a million gallons into the delta over 7 days before the leak was 
stopped.  Within days after this spill, thousands of barrels were spilled when the 
nearby Shell Trans Niger pipeline was attacked by rebels” (Vidal, 2010).  These and 
several other spillages in Nigeria have apparently gone under the radar of the 
international community with regards to pollution of the environment.  “One report 
compiled by World Wildlife Federation (WWF) UK, the World Conservation Union and 
representatives from the Nigerian federal government and the Nigerian Conservation 
Foundation calculated in 2006 that up to 1.5 million tons of oil – 50 times the Exxon 
Valdez disaster – has been released into the Niger Delta alone over the past half 
century” (Vidal, 2010). 
 
Chad, also an African country, discovered oil in the 1970’s with the Chadian basin 
containing a proven reserve of 1 billion barrels of oil, and a potential 5 billion barrels 
(Oil & Gas Journal, 2000), but due to political unrest, it was only in the 2000’s that 
commercial exploitation began, but they have already began experiencing spillages, 
though not on as wide a scale as Nigeria.  In 2013, Chad suspended the Chinese 
state-run China National Petroleum Corporation, which was prospecting for, as well 
as producing oil in Chad, blaming the company for “oil spills in several sites near a 
forest” causing “destruction to trees” (BBC, 2013).  In 2009, Schwartz and Nodem 
report that there was so much environmental damage affecting farmlands and fishing 
communities along the 1,080 km Chad-Cameroon Oil Pipeline Project since its 
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construction from 2000, yet authorities and Exxon, the operators, had done little to 
curb the wanton destruction – perhaps due to lack of regulation? (Schwartz and 
Nodem, 2009). 
 
These are but a few examples in Western and Central Africa which should send 
signals to the Ghanaian authorities to properly put in place measures – including 
regulations – to ensure that any looming environmental disaster is first and foremost 
guarded against through preventive measures, or where prevention fails, combated 
efficiently and in good enough time to prevent massive damage to the environment in 
which the exploitation is taking place.  Much attention has been paid to the discovery 
of the oil and the use to which the revenue generated from its exploitation could be 
put, but little attention has been paid to what preventive and combative measures 
need to be put in place, by both the drilling companies and the regulatory agencies, 
to forestall an environmental disaster.  This dissertation therefore seeks to draw 
attention to the urgent need for both regulators and operators in Ghana’s oil fields to 
put in place regulations and measures to prevent and combat the deleterious effects 
of a spillage, should it occur. 
 
1.3 Aims and Objectives 
Crude oil is an essential commodity in everyday life, and much can be benefited from 
exploitation of crude oil.  However, for some countries, the exploitation has caused as 
much havoc as it has brought blessing, as it has left the environment damaged and 
the populace without their traditional source of livelihood.  Ghana’s crude oil find in 
commercial quantities came with much euphoria for the citizens, and much is 
expected of the government in the utilisation of the revenues to be accrued from its 
exploitation.  However, little thought seems to have been given to the potential 
disaster looming on the advent of exploitation of crude oil in Ghana’s waters. 
 
This research aims to bring to light the measures that have been put in place to 
forestall any environmental disaster after the commencement of exploitation of crude 
oil, if any, and to highlight to what extent these measures can, or what measures need 
to be put in place, to help prevent or combat such a disaster should it occur.  The 
research will also proffer some pointers on what measures have been used in other 
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exploitation regimes, and how effective these measures have been, and attempt to 
highlight which of these measures may be applicable to the local conditions to reap 
the most benefits out of them, and address shortfalls in the measures already in place.  
The report will also seek to solicit the help of the local population in putting in place 
and implementing such measures, in a bid to ensure protection of the marine 
environment and sustainability of the source of livelihood of the people. 
 
1.4 Research Questions 
The research will seek to answer the following questions in a bid to help prevent and 
combat a spillage during exploitation activities in Ghana’s oil fields: 
 Whether Ghana has the legal regime to enforce prevention of environmental 
damage due to exploitation activities; 
 Whether Ghana has the legal regime to enforce combating of a spillage due 
to drilling activities; 
 Whether proactive measures are actively in place at the drill sites in order to 
prevent a spillage of grave environmental consequences; 
 Whether such measures can be effective considering local conditions, and 
whether they are in use in other exploitation regimes; 
 Whether measures have been put in place to combat a spillage should it occur, 
with a view to minimising environmental damage; 
 Whether such measures can be effective in minimising environmental 
damage; 
 Which national provisions have been put in place to engage international help 
in the event of a spillage likely to cause grave environmental damage; 
 Whether a compensatory regime has been put in place to facilitate securing 
international aid in combating a spillage; 
 Whether specific onus has been laid on parties responsible for financial 
burden in the event of environmental pollution through a spillage; 
 Whether the indigenous population have been conscientised on their role in 
preventing and combating an environmental disaster should it occur at the oil 
fields. 
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For the purposes of analysis, these research questions were contracted into the 
following criterion, in order to elicit the required information to answer the research 
topic: 
 Whether Ghana has the legal regime to enforce prevention and/or combating 
of environmental damage due to exploitation activities; 
 Whether proactive measures are actively in place at the drill sites to prevent 
and/or combat a spillage should it occur during exploitation activities; 
 Whether national provision had been made to call in international aid in 
combating a spillage should it occur; 
 Whether a compensatory regime was in place in case of a spillage during 
exploitation activities, and whether such regime, if established, places specific 
onus and/or sanctions on any party or organisation; 
 Whether local conditions and the local population have been factored into any 
preventive, combative or compensatory regime in place with regards to a 
spillage during exploitation activities. 
 
1.5 Key Assumptions and Limitations of the Study 
The major assumption for this study is that Ghana, as an oil producing nation, will 
exploit to the fullest extent, the oil reserves found in its Jubilee and Tweneboah, Enyira 
and Nntome (TEN) fields, and any other oil finds that may be discovered in the future, 
and that this exploitation will be for commercial purposes, and not only to feed the 
local oil and gas demands, i.e., it will be exploited for sale, whether refined or in the 
crude form, on the world market. 
 
The minor assumption for this study is that all responses to questionnaire and 
interviews will be given by respondents and interviewees as dispassionately as 
possible, without any bias towards the organisation of the respondent or interviewee, 
and these responses are given of the respondents’ and interviewees’ own free will, 
without any duress whatsoever. 
 
The major limitation to this study is time constraints, as it had to be undertaken within 
a limited time frame, and alongside other academic work which prevented the 
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researcher from dedicating his full time to the research work in the initial stages of the 
research. 
 
This research would also be limited to actual participants in the extraction of oil and 
gas in Ghana’s waters, and to regulators who have a direct bearing on this extraction, 
and the protection of Ghana’s marine environment.  Questionnaire would be 
administered to senior officials of the Ghana Navy, who are entrusted with protecting 
Ghana’s waters, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) of Ghana, and the 
Ghana Maritime Authority (GMA), as regulatory bodies over Ghana’s marine 
environment.  Questionnaire would also be administered to senior officials of the 
extraction companies, and offshore supply companies servicing the oil and gas 
industry.  Interviews would be conducted with leaders of local communities directly 
affected by the activities in the oil fields.  Questionnaire would also be administered 
on lecturers at the Regional Maritime University (RMU), which is entrusted with 
training local content for the oil and gas industry. 
 
Due to the fact that the industry is a relatively new one in Ghana, there is not much 
published text regarding exploitation of oil and gas in Ghana, so the researcher would 
depend a lot on publications from other jurisdictions, as well as opinions of industry 
experts in Ghana. 
 
Research would be made to ascertain what pertains in other oil producing countries 
and juxtapose that against what pertains locally, taking into consideration local 
conditions and those international “best practices” which can be adapted to suit local 
conditions. 
 
1.6 Organisation of the Research 
This research is structured into 4 chapters after an introduction to the research 
problem, which gives a background and states the problem actually being researched 
on.  Chapter 1 is the methodology used in gathering data, and will also give the data 
collection procedure, the study area and population sample and the data analysis 
procedure. 
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Chapter 2 is a critical review of literature in the area of this study, and examines what 
others have posited within the scope of the study, as well as industry standards and 
what pertains within the industry with regards to the problem identified in Chapter 1. 
 
Chapter 3 gives the findings from the data gathering and analysis derived from the 
data gathered. 
 
Chapter 4 then concludes the research, and proffers recommendations based on the 
findings from the research. 
 
1.7 Methodology and Data Collection 
1.7.1 Methodology 
This research will look at what pertains on the global scene with regards to prevention 
and combat of pollution through exploitation activities at the oil fields, and compare 
them with what pertains on the local scene, to ascertain the level of local 
preparedness with regards to prevention and combat of environmental pollution.  The 
research will also look at recommended practices and preventive methods and 
ascertain to which level same is being implemented.  The research will look at what 
pertains locally which may not be implemented globally but are ideal for local 
conditions to prevent and combat an environmental disaster. 
 
The research data will be gathered using secondary sources for what pertains on the 
global scene – in order to have an idea as to what should prevail on the local scene.  
This research will then use primary sources – primarily questionnaire and interviews 
– to ascertain what pertains on the local scene, in order to compare it with what has 
been known to work in other jurisdictions. 
 
1.7.2 Data Collection 
Divergent and diverse data was collected in order to put into perspective what pertains 
in other jurisdictions where oil exploitation is taking place, and what may be at least 
the basic desirable in the local environment of Ghana’s oil and gas exploitation.  
Though there is a dearth of international regulation regarding exploitation of oil and 
gas and its deleterious effects on the environment, a few international and regional 
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agreements seem to have partially covered pollution emanating from other sources, 
apart from the transportation of oil, and pollution from exploitation activities can be 
covered under these, though not to a great extent. 
 
“As a result of the “Pallas” incident in 1998, Germany set up the Central 
Command for Maritime Emergencies (CCME) (Havariekommando), which is 
responsible for monitoring an oil spill and marine pollution response, and for 
fire-fighting at sea. 
 
After the Bonn Agreement in 1969, signed 2 years after the Torrey Canyon, in 
which Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, 
Sweden and the U K signed the Agreement for cooperation in dealing with 
pollution of the North Sea by oil and other harmful substances, there was a 
lack of well-coordinated plans for a systematic response to major oil spills, and 
the division of responsibilities remained unclear. 
 
It took over a decade, up to 1983 when the European Union and other 
European countries acceded to the Agreement for any proactive preparations 
to be made towards combat of a spillage, and it was only a few years ago that 
the division of responsibilities became clear” (World Ocean Review, 2014, p. 
43). 
 
These clearly indicate that in order for a pre-emptive and successful combat of a major 
spillage, definite structures and laws/regulations need to be put in place to ensure a 
coordinated combating of any pollution which might occur. 
 
The Abidjan Convention for Cooperation in the Protection, Management and 
Development of the Marine and Coastal Environment of the Atlantic Coast of the 
West, Central and Southern Africa Region (Abidjan Convention) and its protocol, 
covers cooperation in combating pollution in cases of emergency, spanning a marine 
area from Mauritania to South Africa, a coastline of just over 14,000 km, and came 
into effect on August 5, 1984.  However, how has this Convention been implemented 
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with regards to responsibilities of nation states, and has it fared any better than the 
Bonn Agreement? 
 
Under the Helsinki Convention which entered into force in 2000, the states bordering 
the Baltic Sea, whose waters this Convention seeks to protect, hold an oil spill 
response exercise every summer, known as the Balex (Baltic Exercise) in a different 
area of the Baltic every year (World Ocean Review, 2014, p. 43). 
 
These agreements, however, at least lay the framework for further collaboration in the 
quest to prevent and combat pollution should it occur in the marine environment, be 
it accidentally or otherwise, though the concentration is on the transportation of the 
oil, and not the actual drilling. 
 
The London Anti-Dumping Convention – The Convention on the Prevention of Marine 
Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter, 1972 – seeks to “protect the marine 
environment from waste due to human activities.  It has been in force since 1975, and 
seeks to promote effective control of all sources of marine pollution, and to take 
practicable steps to prevent pollution of the sea by dumping of wastes and other 
matter” (IMO, 2017).  In 1996, the London Protocol was agreed to further modernise 
the Convention and eventually replace it, and the Protocol prohibited all forms of 
dumping, except for possibly acceptable wastes on a so-called “reverse list” (IMO, 
2017).  The Protocol entered into force in 2006, and spells out prohibitions to dumping 
including: 
“any deliberate disposal into the sea of wastes or other matter from vessels, 
aircraft, platforms or other man-made structures at sea” (Article 1 (4) (1); 
 
“any abandonment or toppling at site of platforms or other man-made 
structures at sea, for the sole purpose of deliberate disposal” (Article 1 (4) (4) 
(IMO, 2017). 
 
These two provisions appear to look at decommissioning of wells, and not specifically 
pollution occurring as a result of actual operations of oil wells.  The Convention and 
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Protocol therefore only places onus on the operators to prevent actual dumping at 
sea during their operations. 
 
Apart from these few regional agreements, there is a lack of international regulation 
when it comes to regulating oil exploitation regimes, especially when compared to 
regulations regarding the transport of oil.  This lack of international regulation is 
highlighted in the case of developing countries, which, in addition to addressing the 
economic and governmental challenges that an oil boom brings, also have to contend 
with the environmental risks and challenges (Moreno, 2009). 
 
“Regions made up of developing countries often do not have the resources 
and governmental structures required to create and manage a legal 
framework for the prevention of environmental harm from offshore oil and gas 
exploration and production activities.  This particular scenario is unfolding in 
the Gulf of Guinea.  The countries in the Gulf of Guinea, in an area in the West 
and Central African coast, are either currently producing offshore or are 
exploring for offshore oil.  However, the region currently lacks a 
comprehensive environmental protection plan to address offshore oil and gas 
exploration and production” (Moreno, 2009, pp. 421 – 422). 
 
This calls into sharp focus the need to streamline regulations for the industry, as well 
as put in place measures and cooperative efforts to combat a spillage should it occur, 
perhaps along the lines of the Balex and the Bonn Agreement. 
 
1.7.3 Study Area 
Data collected for this study will primarily be restricted to the waters offshore Ghana, 
in the West African sub-region.  Specifically, data will be collected on offshore 
exploitation activities in Ghana’s oil fields offshore Cape Three Points.  Though some 
data would be collected from governmental and regulatory agencies based in Accra, 
the capital of Ghana, the data would be specific to activities in the oil fields, in the 
Western Region of Ghana.  The immediate environs of the exploitation activities are 
the waters at Ghana’s Cape Three Points, with notable towns being, Princess Town, 
Miamia and Dixcove.  Cape Three Points itself is a small village at the southernmost 
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tip of Ghana – though activities since the oil find may soon turn it into a booming oil 
town, or at least a sizeable settlement.  The inhabitants of these towns are mostly 
fisher folk, engaged in fishing and fish processing (primarily smoking and drying). 
 
1.7.4 Population Sample 
Due to the very nature of the data needed for this research, it would have been 
impracticable to use a large population sample for the research.  The sample was 
therefore restricted to actual participants in the oil exploitation, vis-à-vis the 
exploitation companies, as well as governmental institutions and agencies involved 
or likely to be involved in prevention and combat of a spillage should one occur at the 
exploitation site, and some service providers to the operators at the oil fields.  The 
sample size was therefore restricted to the following organisations: 
 The Exploitation Companies 
 The Ghana Navy 
 The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
 The Ghana Maritime Authority (GMA) 
 The Ghana Ports & Harbours Authority (GPHA) 
 The Regional Maritime University (RMU) 
 The local population. 
 
Apart from the RMU and the local population, all other organisations would be 
involved in the prevention and the combat of oil pollution at the oil fields.  The RMU, 
which is the premier institution for training local content for the oil fields, were included 
because their training would contribute towards prevention of pollution, since some of 
their trainees would ultimately be involved in the oil fields.  The local population was 
included because activities at the oil fields directly impact on them, and their fishing 
activities would also impact directly on the operations at the oil fields, therefore they 
would also be instrumental in the prevention of a disaster at the oil fields – even if only 
by their absence at the oil fields, which was their traditional fishing grounds.   
 
Respondents from the organisations were from the rank of Deputy Director and above 
for the governmental agencies, and Lieutenant Commander and above for the Navy, 
due to the sensitive nature of the information needed.  For the exploitation companies, 
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respondents were the Drill Environmental Health & Safety Supervisors (Drill EHS 
Supervisors) of the respondent companies.  Random sampling was made with the 
local population, which samples included the Assembly Members of each area and 
chief fishermen of each town/village, as well as some leaders amongst the 
fishmongers. 
 
1.7.5 Data Collection Methods 
Questionnaire were mainly used to collect data for this research, and were 
administered on the selected respondents.  The questionnaire were organisation-
specific, to elicit exact data on what each selected organisation’s role was in the 
prevention and combat of a spillage at the oil fields.  Structured interviews were 
conducted for the local residents, largely due to their level of education, and also in 
order to have an organised response.  An interview was also conducted with the GMA, 
though based on the same lines as the questionnaire for that organisation. 
 
Secondary data from publications, Conventions and Laws were also used to set the 
backdrop for determining best practices and regulations regarding protecting the 
marine environment from pollution due to the exploitation activities, and combating of 
an oil spill to prevent further environmental damage to the environment.  Data was 
sourced from the IMO, international journals and established organisations in the oil 
and gas exploration and exploitation fields, as well as reputable sites on the internet, 
and published books and articles on the subject. 
 
1.7.6 Data Analysis 
Qualitative analysis was used in the analysis of the data, as this was considered the 
best type of analysis to achieve the desired result, in order to highlight any shortfalls 
or potential shortfalls in the prevention and combat of an oil spill in Ghana’s waters 
during the exploitation of oil.  Emphasis could then be placed on what measures 
needed to be implemented by the various organisations engaged in Ghana’s oil and 
gas industry at all times.  Similar but organisation specific questions were asked of 
the selected organisations to elicit information to answer the Research Questions. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
 
 
2.0 LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 Commercial Oil and Gas Drilling in Ghana 
Ghana struck oil and gas in commercial quantities in 2007, and commercial drilling 
begun in 2010.  Oil is a potential pollutant of the environment, so it is important to put 
in place measures to forestall and combat a spill, if one should occur, which cannot 
be ruled out in any environment where commercial exploitation takes place, due to 
the potential harm it will cause the environment if left unchecked. 
 
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982 (UNCLOS 1982), in 
Article 1 (4), has defines pollution of the marine environment as 
 
“The introduction by man, directly or indirectly, of substances or energy into the 
marine environment, including estuaries, which results or is likely to result in such 
deleterious effects as harm to living resources and marine life, hazards to human 
health, hindrance to marine activities, including fishing, and other legitimate uses 
of the sea, impairment of quality for use of sea water and reduction of amenities”. 
(IMO, 1982, p 2). 
 
Exploitation for oil and gas have been on-going for over a century under various 
regimes, both on-shore and off-shore.  For on-shore exploitation, to a large extent, it 
is possible to control the potential of a spillage such that it does not cause much 
damage to the environment.  In the Middle East, notably Saudi Arabia, Jordan, 
Yemen, Sudan and Libya, as well as in Siberia in Russia, much damage has not been 
caused to the environment because most of the exploitation is on-shore, and apart 
from the activities of saboteurs, as in the case of Sudan and Nigeria, it is relatively 
easy to control oil spills.  However, when left uncontrolled, grave damage can be 
caused to the environment in which it is spilled.  In May 2010, an ExxonMobil pipeline 
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in the Niger Delta in Nigeria was ruptured, and reportedly spilled more than a million 
gallons of oil into the delta over a week before the leak was stopped (Vidal, 2010). 
 
As noted in the World Ocean Review, 2014,  
“Offshore gas and oil production began more than a century ago.  With many 
shallow-water fields already exhausted, these natural resources are now 
being extracted at ever greater depths.  Production rates are higher than ever, 
while oil pollution is decreasing.  However, this (decrease) is largely due to the 
stringent regulations applicable to shipping: the explosion at the Deepwater 
Horizon oil rig clearly demonstrated that safety is a long-neglected issue in the 
oil (extraction) industry” (World Ocean Review, 2014). 
 
Some control measures used to combat oil spills on-shore have been to cap wells 
and replace pipelines.  In Nigeria, much of the spillages on-shore (in the Niger Delta 
area) has been caused by sabotage or old and leaky pipelines.  Thus, for on-shore 
drilling, prompt and efficient measures put in place to combat spills have been largely 
effective. 
 
It is much more difficult to control oil spills that occur offshore.  Arguably, many of the 
world’s oil exploitation regimes take place offshore – the Falklands in the United 
Kingdom, the Atlantic Ocean in the United States and Canada, the Arctic Ocean and 
the Atlantic Ocean off the Coast of Africa.  What pose a difficulty in the management 
of oil spills offshore are the elements.  Offshore, nature is much more difficult to 
harness, and the actions of the tides and waves, as well as wind and current actions 
carry any spillage to great distances, thus making its control more difficult and causing 
more pollution than on-shore spillages.  The situation gets worse when the spillage is 
accidental and comes directly from the source of the oil, as in a blow-out.   
 
The need to guard against spillages at exploitation sites cannot be over-emphasised: 
the Ixtoc I spilled about 475,000 tonnes of oil, the Deepwater Horizon spilled over 
700,000 tonnes of oil before they could be brought under control.  Both these spills 
far outweigh spills from ships: the Atlantic Express spilled 287,000 tonnes, the ABT 
Summer spilled 260,000 tonnes, the Castillo de Bellver spilled 252,000 tonnes, the 
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Amoco Cadiz spilled 223,000 tonnes, the Haven spilled 144,000 tonnes, the Odyssey 
spilled 132,000 tonnes, the Torrey Canyon spilled 119,000 tonnes, the Sea Star 
spilled 115,000 tonnes, the Prestige spilled 63,000 tonnes, the Exxon Valdez spilled 
37,000 tonnes (World Ocean Review, 2014).   
 
It can be seen that though spillages from ships have been the catalysts for 
Conventions to be adopted, spillages at exploitation sites are far more devastating to 
the marine environment in terms of quantities spilled.  The necessity to address 
spillages from exploitation sites is highlighted when one considers the fact that “there 
are currently around 900 large-scale oil and gas platforms around the world” (World 
Ocean Review, 2014). 
 
To ensure that the marine environment is not unduly polluted and to hasten response 
to pollution due to oil spillage, the United Nations (UN) and the IMO have adopted 
various Conventions and Protocols to protect the marine environment by prescribing 
ways to prevent and combat spills that do occur.  However, these conventions, though 
seemingly adequate in addressing pollution arising from the transportation of oil in 
various modes, have been woefully inadequate in the area of actual exploitation 
activities.   
 
The Ghana Shipping Act 2003, (Act 645), was passed to enhance the development 
of merchant shipping in the country, but failed to cover issues relating to marine 
pollution, oil pollution liability and compensation regimes, though these aspects are 
covered in international conventions which Ghana is party to. 
 
Relevant laws with regard to marine pollution in Ghana, before the commencement 
of commercial exploitation of oil and gas, were the Oil in Navigable Waters Act, 1964, 
the Environmental Protection Agency Act, 1994, and the Ghana Maritime Security Act 
in 2004.  These laws, however, were deficient in prescribing legislation to regulate 
exploitation activities in Ghana’s waters which may lead to pollution. 
 
The Ghana Maritime Authority (GMA) was established under Act 630 of 2002 and 
charged with the responsibility of monitoring, regulating and coordinating activities in 
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the maritime industry.  As part of its mandate, it has the duty to ensure in collaboration 
with such other public agencies and institutions as the Board may determine the 
prevention of marine source pollution, protection of the marine environment and 
response to marine environment incidents. Due to the paucity of legislation to regulate 
the marine environment with regards to oil and gas exploration and exploitation, the 
GMA in October 2010, presented to Parliament the Marine Pollution Bill, amendments 
to the Ghana Maritime Authority Act and the Ghana Maritime Security Act, and other 
legislations to regulate the oil and gas industry 
(http://www.ghanamaritime.org/ind.php?news=1&pndet=23).  This paper looks at 
how adequately or efficiently Ghana’s laws, as well as the established practices and 
procedures of organisations engaged in Ghana’s oil and gas industry, can prevent 
and/or combat an environmental damage due to spillage at the actual drill site, and 
not just in the transportation of the oil. 
 
2.2 What is a Blow Out? 
The Illustrated Petroleum Reference Dictionary defines a blowout as an “Out of control 
gas and/or oil pressure erupting from a well being drilled; a dangerous uncontrolled 
eruption of gas and oil from a well; a wild well” (Langenkamp, 1985).  An A-Z of 
Offshore Oil & Gas also defines a blowout as “A sudden, violent, uncontrolled escape 
of gas/water/oil, with mud, at high pressure from a well” (Whitehead, 1983), and goes 
on to explain that  
“blowouts occur when the formation pressure exceeds the hydrostatic head of 
the drilling fluid, and have caused extensive damage to, and even loss of, 
drilling rigs and equipment.  They are also dangerous to life, and at best cause 
costly delays in the drilling programme” (Whitehead, 1983).   
 
The Schlumberger Oilfield Glossary defines a blowout as an “uncontrolled flow of 
formation fluids from a well, the wellbore or into lower pressurized subsurface zones 
(underground blowout)” (Schlumberger, 2017). 
 
From the above definitions, blowouts are accidental and uncontrollable, in a controlled 
(pressurized) environment, and usually cause much damage to the environment into 
which the effects of the blowout is released.  This is because due to the accidental 
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nature of the occurrence, a blowout is difficult to bring under control immediately, and 
would usually spill a lot of the contents of the well before it is brought under control.  
The Santa Barbara oil spill caused by a blowout on Platform A of Union Oil spilled an 
estimated 3 million gallons of oil before it was brought under control (Clarke and 
Hemphil, 2001).  For the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill, also the result of a blowout, an 
estimated 3.19 million barrels of oil was spilled before the well was finally successfully 
capped (Ocean Portal, 2017).  Many drilling wells now have blowout preventers 
(BOPs) which are specialized valves to prevent blowouts, or at least give an early 
enough signal for measures to be taken to prevent blowouts. 
 
Blowouts are different from blow-ups in that blowouts occur during actual drilling 
operations on the well or pipe, whilst blow-ups occur during transportation of the 
product by vessel or pipeline, either accidentally, usually caused by fire or a ruptured 
pipeline, or by controlled explosions to sink a stricken vessel. 
 
2.3 What Causes Blowouts? 
The enormous pressure of the rock formations around an oil reservoir is the 
underlying cause of blowouts (Petro Industry News, 2014). 
 
Oil naturally occurs over a period of millions of years, during which all of the 
water is compressed and pressurised out of the carbon-based substance 
(normally life-forms of one type or another) by the layers of sediment that form 
on top of it.  When drilling, this pressure is counteracted by the use of mud 
around the drilling site, which helps to balance the hydrostatic pressure. If this 
balance is upset, water, gas or oil can infiltrate the wellbore or even the drill 
itself – a phenomenon known as a “kick” – and this can quickly escalate into 
a blowout if not promptly identified and addressed.  (Petro Industry News, 
2014) 
 
The use of the wrong set of ‘rams’ to shut in the well can also be a catalyst for blowouts 
(northdakotaoillawyers.com, 2013).  In drilling oil and gas, various means are used to 
prevent the escape of same into the environment, a major one of which is a Blow Out 
Preventer (BOP).   
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The BOP stack usually consists of two sets of Rams and one “annular” 
preventer. The stack consists of “pipe rams” which are the main means of 
preventing hydrocarbons from escaping, ‘blind” rams which are used when no 
drill pipe is in the hole and completely shuts in the well, and “shear” rams which 
cut away the heavy drill pipe and completely shut in the well.  Blowouts can 
be caused by the use of the wrong set of rams to shut in the well. There are 
times the pipe rams are not effective to shut in the well, but are used by the 
drill crew because they mainly train with pipe rams. Blowouts, explosions and 
serious injuries occur when the BOP’s are closed and the well is supposed to 
be shut-in.  Unfortunately, down hole pressures can exceed the rated pressure 
of the BOPs. In addition, the BOPs have to be activated to shut-in the well.  
(North Dakota Oil Lawyers, 2013) 
 
Migration of oil or gas into the drill well or hole may also cause blowouts (North Dakota 
Oil Lawyers, 2013). 
“Trip tanks” are used to measure the amount of drilling mud that is being 
returned to the surface. If mud volume is increasing at too fast a rate, it is an 
indication that a blowout may be about to occur. The increased volume of mud 
means that gas or oil is migrating into the hole, and the well may be about to 
blow out.  When the well is being drilled and the crew is tripping in or out of 
the hole, mud volume is lost. If that mud is not replaced the down-hole 
pressure may overcome the mud weight, and a blowout can occur.  (North 
Dakota Oil Lawyers, 2013) 
 
Risking controlling the hydrocarbons that enter the drill well or hole without adequate 
precautions also cause blowouts (North Dakota Oil Lawyers, 2013). 
 
By far, the most common cause of blowouts is drilling “underbalanced” – taking 
the risks of controlling the hydrocarbons that enter the hole by circulating them 
out while drilling. Safe drilling practices require the mud to be “weighted” up to 
hold back the pressure, but operators get in a hurry to produce the well, and 
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time is money, so they drill underbalanced and lose control of the well.  (North 
Dakota Oil Lawyers, 2013) 
 
The above indicates that the causes of blowouts are all human-induced.  The natural 
setting of the oil itself makes extraction difficult, therefore extra caution and skill needs 
to be applied in its extraction.  However, due to the expensive nature of oil exploitation, 
companies and individuals may want to avoid as much cost as possible, and thus pay 
less attention to safety details as they should, giving rise to many of the blowouts 
which have occurred world-wide.  “In its final report, published in December 2011, a 
US Committee of experts concluded that a series of technical failures and flawed 
decisions led to the disaster of the Deepwater Horizon” (World Ocean Review, 2014).  
This is what the oil industry needs to guard against. 
 
2.4 Types of Blowouts 
There are three main types of blowouts identified over the years (Petro Industry News, 
2014): 
 Surface Blowouts: During a surface blowout, the drill string is ejected out of 
the well, and the force with which the oil or gas escapes from the well may 
cause damage to the drilling rig, with a fire being the most dangerous and 
costly.  These are the most common types of blowouts, and risk damaging the 
surrounding terrain in addition to the rig itself (Petro Industry News, 2014). 
 Underground Blowouts:  These are situations where oil or gas escape from a 
well in high pressure area to a low pressure area (Schlumberger, 2017).  This 
type of blowout may not cause serious damage to the environment 
immediately, as the flow does not escape above ground.  However, it might 
have effects on other wells in the area due to the change in pressure. 
 Underwater Blowouts:  These occur under water (sub-sea), mainly due to 
equipment failure, and are the most difficult to deal with (petro-online, 2013).  
They are situations where oil or gas escape from the well into the sea, and 
have the most deleterious effects on the marine environment.  They are the 
most difficult to deal with, and may persist for the longest time.  The biggest 
and deepest underwater blowout in history is that of the Deepwater Horizon in 
the Gulf of Mexico in 2010 (Petro Industry News, 2013). 
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2.5 Some Deleterious Effects of Blowouts 
Oil spills are very harmful to the environment within which the oil is spilt, in that “the 
damage caused by such spills is permanent and takes a long time to clean up” 
(Conserve Energy Future, 2017).  Being a hydrocarbon compacted and accumulated 
over millions of years, oil does not easily mix with the environment within which it is 
spilled.  If oil is spilled on land, it negatively affects the soil in which it is spilled, and 
renders farmlands and other agricultural lands unusable for those purposes.  Oil 
spilled on land also seeps into rivers and other water bodies and contaminates them 
such that they can no longer be treated for use by humans, or at the very best, 
treatment of such water bodies for human consumption becomes very expensive, as 
the oil contains cancer-causing compounds such as benzene. 
 
The Mingubalak Oil Spill, also known as the Fergana Valley Oil Spill, was 
caused by a blowout on Well No. 5 in the Mingubalak Oil Field, Fergana Valley, 
Uzbekistan, on March 2, 1992, and is widely known as the largest accidental 
terrestrial oil spill (after the intentional burning of Kuwaiti oil fields during the 
Gulf War).  An estimated 285,000 tons (about 88 million gallons) of oil was 
lost, released into the environment.  There was no clean up, and the oil seeped 
into the ground, and totally destroyed the agricultural sector of the economy.  
It had a negative effect on wildlife as well, birds were covered with oil which 
was so heavy it made them unable to fly (Mikucki, 2013).   
 
In November 2016, “Britain’s High Court began hearing lawsuits filed by the Ogale 
and Bille people of Nigeria against Shell, alleging that decades of oil spills have fouled 
the water and destroyed the lives of thousands of fishermen and farmers in the Niger 
River Delta, where a Shell subsidiary has operated since the 1950’s” (Al Jazeera, 
2016).  Local communities in Nigeria have been fighting the Oil majors for decades 
for compensation, due to the deleterious effects of oil spillages into their lands and 
water bodies, destroying their means of livelihood.  Cleaning up spillages on land can 
take up to a quarter of a century, and is very costly in terms of financial resources and 
time, and it is yet to be made known how long the soil would take to replenish its 
fertility (Mustoe, 2016). 
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Figure 2: Water bodies and farmlands in Nigeria polluted by oil 
Source: http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/11/shell-sued-uk-decades-oil-spills-nigeria-
161122193545741.html 
 
Some residents have claimed that drinking the contaminated water from the rivers 
and water bodies is “causing strange diseases in the communities, skin diseases, 
sudden deaths, impotence and low sperm counts (Al Jazeera, 2017). 
 
When oil is spilled into the oceans, it has no less deleterious effects.  Marine and 
aquatic life suffocate because the oil prevents fishes from getting oxygen in the water, 
killing millions of them and may even threaten some species.  Plankton and other 
aquatic species also die off, hampering the development and growth of fishes and 
other marine life, which depend on plankton for survival.   
 
Figure 3: View of the Deepwater Horizon oil spill taken from above in June, 2010 
Source: http://ocean.si.edu/ocean-photos/oil-spill-above  
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Marine mammals and aquatic birds such as seagulls and pelicans also feel the 
negative effects of the spills – their feathers get all oiled up and renders them unable 
to fly, they do not get enough to eat, and the little they get to eat are contaminated, 
thus posing a danger to their health as well. 
 
Figure 4: An oiled seabird was found dead on the beach at Alaska, November 1997. (NOAA) 
Source:  http://response.restoration.noaa.gov/oil-and-chemical-spills/oil-spills/how-oil-harms-animals-and-
plants-marine-environments.html 
 
The effect of a spillage on the economy of a community is also negative, in that it 
renders beaches unusable for recreational activities, mostly because the waters are 
unusable for recreational activities, as well as the unpleasant odour coming from the 
dead fishes and other mammals at the contaminated areas.  In Ghana, a spillage of 
mud in 2010 caused the communities to be unable to fish for some weeks because of 
the contamination (Bedgley, 2012).  
 
Therefore, from a myriad of angles, oil spills caused by blowouts or other activities 
related to extraction of the oil have negative effects on the environment and 
inhabitants, with very little positive effects. 
 
2.6 How Can Spillage Due To Blowouts Be Prevented 
The most common method of preventing blowouts is the use of Blow Out Preventers 
(BOP) on the well during drilling.  BOPs are high pressure wellhead valves designed 
to shut off the uncontrolled flow of hydro-carbons (COGIS, 2017).  The Illustrated 
Petroleum Reference Dictionary also defines a BOP as “A stack or an assembly of 
heavy-duty valves attached to the top of the casing to control well pressure” 
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(Langenkamp, 1985).  There are several types of BOPs like single ram and double 
ram preventers.  They are mostly monitoring devises on the drill well to monitor the 
ingress and egress of water and mud from the well and sound an alarm when the rate 
of ingress or egress exceeds the set rate.   
 
 
Figure 5: Image of Ocean Drill BOP being deployed 
Source:  http://www.drilltech.cn/info/Ocean-drilling-BOP-137-1.htm 
 
The BOPs are used to give advance warning of an impending blowout, to enable 
preventive or corrective action to be taken before it reaches the critical pressure point 
when the blowout will occur.  At all times, a critical monitoring of the BOP would be 
the best means of preventing a blowout. 
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Being able to recognise underground blowouts is also a major pointer to an impending 
blowout, and immediate corrective action can prevent the underground blowout from 
escalating into a surface blowout.  Due to its very nature, underground blowouts can 
be difficult to recognise, therefore experience in drilling wells is key in recognising 
such types of blowouts, in order to take corrective action to prevent it developing into 
a surface blowout. 
 
Well capping has also been used to prevent blowouts.  However, this may only be 
effective at the early stages of a blowout, if the pressure mounts to a certain degree, 
capping the well may be too late to prevent a blowout.  In the Deepwater Horizon 
incident in the Gulf of Mexico, initial attempts at capping the affected well did not yield 
the desired results because the blowout had degenerated to such an extent that 
capping the well alone could not prevent it.  The well was only successfully capped 
after 87 days, having released an estimated 3.19 million barrels (Ocean Portal, 2017) 
to 4.9 million barrels (Ebinger, 2016) of oil into the ocean. 
 
From the Deepwater Horizon blowout “which raised questions about the safety of 
deep water drilling, the adequacy of the corporate response to the disaster and of 
governmental regulation of offshore drilling” (Allin, 2016), lessons can be learnt on 
preventive measures to be taken in order to prevent blowouts.  The lessons learnt 
point to vigilance in monitoring, and the need to use and maintain proper equipment 
in order to prevent equipment failure and forestall a blowout.  The New Scientist lists 
8 failures that caused the Gulf Oil Spill: 
 Dodgy cement used at the bottom of the borehole, which did not create a seal; 
 Valve failure at the bottom of the pipe which were designed to stop the flow of 
oil and gas but failed; 
 Misinterpretation of pressure tests by the crew; 
 Not spotting the leak soon enough; 
 Valve no. 2 failure in the blowout preventer; 
 An overwhelmed separator which was not designed for the quantity of oil and 
gas as well as drill mud which were diverted into it; 
 Failure of the on-board gas alarm; and 
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 A flat battery which should have enabled the BOP to kick in automatically once 
control through the main lines were lost due to the explosion (New Scientist, 
2010). 
 
Careful attention paid to these pointers can help prevent future blowouts on other rigs. 
 
2.7 Where Have Spillage Due To Blowouts Been Known To Occur 
The Deepwater Horizon blowout is the one which wreaked the most havoc in US 
waters, and arguably the largest accidental oil spill in history, spilling an estimated 5 
million barrels of oil into the Gulf of Mexico (Allin, 2016).  It was caused by a blowout 
on the exploratory Macondo 252 well “as the drill hole had been – or was being – 
cemented to seal the well so that the drill pipe could be removed and the Deepwater 
Horizon could be moved to a new location” (Allin, 2016).  The Deepwater Horizon was 
drilling oil in the Gulf of Mexico, which oil was located 3.5 km below the sea floor and 
7 km below the drilling platform (Allin, 2016).  The immediate cause of the blowout 
was the failure of the cement used to seal the well, and the failure of the BOP, which 
was designed to cut through the drill casing and seal the well in case of an emergency 
(Allin, 2016). 
 
Quite recently, in 2015, an oil well owned by Oasis Petroleum Inc. experienced a 
blowout and was out of control for nearly three days, spilling more than 1,667 barrels 
of crude oil and 2,000 barrels of brine (Oil Spill Intelligence Report, 2015). 
 
The Ixtoc I exploratory well blew out on June 3, 1979 in the Bay of Campeche in 
Mexico, and by the time it was brought under control, had spilled an estimated 140 
million gallons into the Bay (Congressional Digest, 2010).  This blowout has also been 
recorded as one of the worst oil spills in history. 
 
The Mingubalak Oil Spill, also known as the Fergana Valley Oil Spill, was caused by 
a blowout on Well No. 5 in the Mingubalak Oil Field, Fergana Valley, Uzbekistan, on 
March 2, 1992, and is widely known as the largest accidental terrestrial oil spill. 
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From the foregone, there can be no gainsaying the fact that blowouts which have 
occurred in history have had very damaging environmental effects on the ecology into 
which the oil has been spilled.  It is also evident that blowouts, due to their very nature, 
are difficult to bring under control, thus their propensity to spill a lot and cause much 
environmental damage before they are brought under control – or empty the contents 
of the well on which the blowout occurred. 
 
2.8 How Can Spillage Due To Blowouts Be Controlled 
Due to the very nature of blowouts, they cannot be controlled once they occur.  The 
effects of the blowout is to leave an oil well gushing out its contents into the 
environment, and the only way any form of control can be implemented to curb greater 
environmental damage is to cap the wellhead – i.e., seal the well which is gushing out 
the oil.  Unless and until the wellhead is capped, the effects of the blowout cannot be 
controlled, since the oil gushing out is coming from a pressurised region into a less 
pressurised one.  To cap a wellhead, cement is usually used in varying degrees, and 
if the well has experienced a blowout, it is normal to cap the wellhead permanently, 
using blocks of cement which can weigh up to 5,000 tons.  Wells which experience 
blowouts are not usually used again, but subsidiary wells are drilled if the same 
reserve is to be exploited again. 
 
2.9 Does The Real Possibility of a Spillage Due To Blowout in Ghana’s 
Waters Exist? 
Development and production of Ghana’s oil and gas in commercial quantities is a long 
term activity, spanning 15 – 25 years for the Jubilee Field along, with longer time span 
for the TEN (Tweneboah, Enyira and Ntomme) Fields, which contain larger reserves 
(GNPC, 2016).  Thus, a Development Plan has been crafted out which ensures that 
the development and production will be done in such a way as to have minimum 
adverse impact on the environment (GNPC, 2016).  The Plan covers all phases from 
Development through Production to Abandonment.  A third Field, the Sankofa Gye-
Nyame Field, has also been discovered, and exploratory works are currently on-going 
on this field.  Commercial exploitation of the Jubilee Field started in 2010, and that of 
the TEN Fields started in 2016 for Oil, and 2017 for Natural Gas.  The TEN fields are 
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estimated to have in excess of 300 million barrels of oil and 360 billion cubic feet of 
gas – this field holds Ghana’s major gas reserves (GNPC, 2016). 
 
With the production of oil and natural gas projected into 2033 and beyond (GNPC, 
2016), it is evident that the real possibility of a blowout exists in Ghana’s oil and gas 
exploitation activities.  This is buttressed by the fact that the Jubilee Field is located 
60 nautical miles offshore, and the TEN and Sankofa Gye-Nyame Fields extend even 
further, creating the environment for a blowout if extra care and attention is not paid 
to exploitation activities. 
 
Again, blowouts are accidental occurrences and need to be adequately guarded 
against, but with oil exploitation taking place in a pressurised environment, especially 
offshore, blowouts are a real possibility in Ghana’s oil and gas industry. 
 
2.10 How Can Pollution From Blowouts Be Combated 
The most basic and urgent demand resulting from a spillage due to blowout is to 
identify the source of the blowout and take immediate measures to prevent or reduce 
further spillage.  Initial reports of the spillage must be reported to the appropriate 
authority and a contingency plan immediately activated to prevent major damage to 
the environment. 
 
An Oil Spill Contingency Plan is a requirement in all incidents of oil spills, and the IMO 
has published a Manual on Oil Pollution – Contingency Planning, which “provides 
guidance to governments, particularly those of developing countries, on ways and 
means of establishing a response organisation and preparing contingency plans” for 
oil spillages (IMO, 1995).  The Contingency Plan adopted “takes into account the 
OPRC, 1990”, and also has a section on Combating Oil Spills, published separately 
from the Contingency Plan.  Ghana factored the tenets of the Manual into the Maritime 
Pollution Act, 2016, which prescribes setting up a National Coordinator to prepare a 
National Contingency Plan for preparedness and response in cases of oil spills. 
In combating the oil spill, and as part of the information to be provided by those at the 
source of the spill, the “type of oil together with an estimate of the quantity spilled” 
should be disclosed (IMO, 2005, p 41).  This information would be necessary to 
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determine the type of combating to be used to manage the spillage.  Spilled oil is 
normally “carried by the currents and blown by the wind, so immediate measures 
should be taken to combat the spill to minimise pollution damage to the marine 
environment” (IMO, 2005, p 51). 
 
One option in combating a spill is to use “containment booms to localise the spillage 
and prevent the oil from further drifting as skimming devices are used to recover the 
oil from the sea surface” (IMO, 2005, p 51).  Alternatively, other methods such as 
positioning booms in places where floating oil will naturally collect, either in open 
waters or more commonly close to shore, ready for recovery using skimmers and 
pumps (IMO, 2005, p 51).  These methods demand that containment booms be 
readily or easily available at the site of the spillage – i.e., at the drilling site, in order 
to be immediately deployed to forestall grave environmental damage, and may only 
be effective for relatively minor spillages.  However, for spillages due to blowouts, this 
method may be inadequate, unless the wellhead can be immediately capped to 
forestall a major spill. 
 
Spillages from blowouts can also be combated using chemical dispersants.  “Wave 
action and turbulence due to tides and currents causes some of the oil to break down 
into small droplets which can be carried down into the water column, a process known 
as dispersion.  This process can be enhanced by the application of chemical 
dispersants” (IMO, 2005, p 101).  Dispersants are chemical agents that alter the 
physical behaviour and properties of oil on the sea surface, thereby enabling 
penetration of the dispersant into the oil and increasing the rate of droplet formation 
and assimilation of the oil into the water column. 
 
Dispersants can be used to combat oil spillages from blowouts – and in fact, were 
used in the cases of the Ixtoc I and Deepwater Horizon.  However, in deciding to use 
chemical dispersants, environmental issues should be taken into consideration, 
especially the effect that dispersants would have on marine life.  This is because the 
dispersants themselves are potentially damaging to the marine environment, and they 
don’t get rid of the oil but rather breaks the oil down for it to assimilate into the water 
column, thereby still maintaining, albeit to a lesser degree, the pollution the oil will 
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cause to the marine environment.  Dispersants may be applied or sprayed from 
shipboard sources or from light aircraft, and therefore the decision to use dispersants 
would entail having available or easily available the logistics to deploy them in the 
event of a spillage. 
 
Another method of combating a spillage is in situ burning, i.e., the intentional burning 
of the oil on the surface of the water – this method was also initially tried during the 
Deepwater Horizon oil spill.  Under ideal conditions, this can be an effective way of 
removing large quantities of oil in a relatively short period of time (IMO, 2005, p 119).  
In the Deepwater Horizon case, incendiary bombs were initially used to try to set the 
oil ablaze.  However, for in situ burning to be completely successful, the oil needs to 
be thick – an ideal situation in the event of a spillage due to blowouts – and the 
thickness maintained during the burning.  In actual burning of oil on water surface, as 
the oil burns, the thickness reduces, and therefore the fire point of the oil, thereby 
naturally pushing the fire to a natural death.  In order to ensure that all the oil is burned, 
there is the need to maintain the thickness through containment, so the oil can all burn 
off the surface of the sea.  This containment is done through the use of fire-resistant 
containment booms. 
 
Again, before in situ burning can be utilised, consideration must be given to its effects, 
i.e., the thick black plume of smoke it will generate, and the residues of materials that 
remain after the burning has stopped (IMO, 2005, pp 121 – 122).  Another initial issue 
before in situ burning can be considered is that the fire does not flash back to the 
source of the oil – e.g., the wellhead, which will create an even bigger explosion and 
catapult the spillage out of control. 
 
For spillages on land, washing or flushing using high pressure hot water (as is used 
in tank cleaning on oil tankers) can also be used to combat the effects of the spillage.  
However, this method may also only be useful in the case of small spillages, and may 
be ineffective to combat the effects of a blowout. 
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2.11 Current Situation In Terms of Legislation 
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), 1982 defines 
pollution of the marine environment in Article 1(4) as  
The introduction by man, directly or indirectly, of substances or energy into the 
marine environment, including estuaries, which results or is likely to result in 
such deleterious effects as harm to living resources and marine life, hazards 
to human health, hindrance to marine activities, including fishing and other 
legitimate uses of the sea, impairment of quality of use of sea water and 
reduction of amenities (IMO, 1982) 
 
Article 145 of the same UNCLOS also requires that necessary measures be taken to 
protect the marine environment with respect to pollution from exploration and 
exploitation activities in the “Area”, which is “the seabed and ocean floor and sub soil 
thereof, beyond the limits of national jurisdiction” according to Article 1(1) (UNCLOS, 
1982).  Article 192 of UNCLOS states that “states have the obligation to protect and 
preserve the marine environment” (UNCLOS, 1982).  Article 194(1) requires states to 
“individually or jointly, as appropriate, take all measures consistent with the 
Convention as are necessary to prevent, reduce and control pollution of the 
marine environment from any source, using for this purpose the best 
practicable means at their disposal and in accordance with their capabilities, 
and to harmonise their policies in this connection” (IMO, 1982). 
 
Article 194 (3) (c) particularly states that measures taken pursuant to dealing with all 
sources of pollution of the marine environment shall be designed to minimise to the 
fullest extent possible  
“pollution from installations and devices used in exploration or exploitation of 
the natural resources of the seabed and subsoil, in particular measures for 
preventing accidents and dealing with emergencies, ensuring the safety of 
operations at sea, and regulating the design, construction, equipment, 
operation and manning of such installations or devices” (IMO, 1982). 
 
Article 195 requires that states, “in taking measures to prevent, reduce and control 
pollution of the marine environment, shall act so as not to transfer, directly or 
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indirectly, damage or hazards from one area to another, or transfer one type of 
pollution into another” (IMO, 1982). 
 
Articles 207 and 210 relate particularly to the activities states should take in order to 
prevent pollution, either from land based sources or from seabed activities, and 
activities in the area, as well as from dumping, which will harm the marine 
environment. 
 
In the 1950’s, the world was not yet overly concerned with major oil spills.  The 
precursor of marine pollution prevention conventions was the International 
Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil, 1954 (OILPOL 1954), 
which mainly dealt with operational discharges from ships (Kuokkanen, Couzens, 
Honkonen and Lewis, 2016).  The OILPOL 1954 was the first well set out international 
convention on marine pollution, which Ghana ratified and gave effect to by virtue of 
the Oil in Navigable Waters Act, 1964, Act 235 (Mbiah, 2009).  The OILPOL 1954 
convention was mainly to deal with ship source pollution, mostly from normal 
operational discharges, as ships usually just discharged their oily wastes into the 
oceans at the time of the passage of the OILPOL 1954.  The OILPOL 1954 was, 
however, soon overtaken by events and other developments in the maritime transport 
industry, and though it went through various amendments and updates in 1962, 1969 
and 1971, it was woefully inadequate to address the new challenges in protecting the 
marine environment from pollution by oil. 
 
The Inter-governmental Maritime Consultative Organisation (IMCO) – the precursor 
to the IMO – Conference in 1969 therefore adopted the International Convention on 
Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage 1969 (CLC 1969), which brought bout 
significant changes to the OILPOL 1954 regime (Mbiah, 2009). In 1969, the IMCO 
Conference completed the International Convention Relating to Intervention on the 
High Seas in Cases of Oil Pollution Casualties 1969 (Intervention Convention 1969), 
which entered into force on May 6, 1975.  However, in the 1970’s, environmental 
concerns were so heightened that it became evident that the CLC 1969 compensation 
limits were inadequate to meet serious marine pollution incidents.  Due to these 
concern raised, the IMCO developed a supplementary regime to the CLC 1969, the 
 34 
 
International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for 
Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage 1971 (FUND 1971), which entered into force 
on October 16, 1978, and has also been ratified by Ghana (Mbiah, 2009). 
 
However, the CLC 1969 and the FUND 1971 were still not adequate enough to 
address all the concerns of the international community with regards to the 
environment.  This then led to the development of the most comprehensive instrument 
to date, the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships 
(MARPOL 73/78), which was designed to supersede the OILPOL 1954, and entered 
into force on October 2, 1983.  Ghana has incorporated the relevant provisions of the 
MARPOL 73/78 into the Maritime Pollution Act, 2016 and also the Ghana Shipping 
Act, 2003 (Act 645) (Mbiah, 2009).  Ghana has also ratified other International 
Conventions on protection of the marine environment from pollution, including the 
International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Co-operation 
(OPRC) 1990, which Ghana ratified in 2010 and has incorporated into its laws, 
including the Maritime Pollution Act, 2016. 
 
Arguably, these appear to be the main international law provisions towards the 
prevention of pollution of the marine environment through exploitation activities, and 
their coverage of the subject matter leaves much to be desired. 
 
The IMO has other conventions that seek to prevent the pollution of the marine 
environment due to transportation activities, most notably the MARPOL 73/78, and 
the HNS Convention, as well as activities relating to maritime transport, notably the 
Ballast Water Convention and the Anti-Dumping Convention, but there is no 
international convention relating purely to pollution of the environment through 
exploitation activities.  However, the dearth of international conventions and 
regulations with regards to pollution due to exploration and exploitation activities 
should not lead to rampant pollution of the environment due to these activities.  It is 
the responsibility of nation states to enact and implement regulations which will 
prevent and combat pollution in the marine environment due to exploration and 
exploitation activities.   
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The MARPOL 73/78, the main IMO Convention relating to marine pollution by oil, in 
Article 1, enjoins states parties to “undertake to give effect to the Convention and 
Annexes, on order to prevent the pollution of the marine environment by the discharge 
of harmful substances or effluences containing such substances in contravention of 
the Convention” (MARPOL 73/78).  In relation to pollution through exploration and 
exploitation activities, however, Article 3 (ii) expressly stipulates that ‘Discharge does 
not include release of harmful substances directly arising from the exploration, 
exploitation and associated offshore processing of seabed mineral resources” 
(MARPOL 73/78).  The MARPOL is thus specifically geared towards the 
transportation of substances that can potentially harm the marine environment, and 
not necessarily the exploration and exploitation of such substances. 
 
2.12 Specific Legislation Protecting the Marine Environment 
Ghana’s closest neighbour in English-speaking West Africa, Nigeria, has been drilling 
oil for over half a decade, since its first export in 1960, and is the largest exporter of 
oil from Africa (Nuhu, 1997).  According to Daniel Workman, Nigeria was the 8th 
largest exporter of crude oil in 2016, exporting about US$ 27 billion worth of crude oil, 
accounting for about 4% of global crude oil exports (Workman, 2017).  In Nigeria, due 
to the long period of exploitation of oil, and the deleterious effects of pollution of the 
environment through spillages, whether accidental or through sabotage or deliberate 
discharges, several laws have been passed to regulate the protection of the 
environment, through prevention and combating of pollution due to the activities of 
the exploration and exploitation companies.  The Agency mandated to protect the 
environment of Nigeria is the National Environmental Standards and Regulations 
Enforcement Agency (NESREA), under the ministerial supervision of Nigeria’s 
Ministry of Environment.  The NESREA was established by an Act of Parliament, the 
National Environment Standards and Regulation Enforcement Agency (NESREA) Act 
of 2007, which replaced the Federal Environmental Protection Agency (FEPA) Act.  
The NESREA Act is the embodiment of laws and regulations focused on the 
protection and sustainable development of the environment of Nigeria and its natural 
resources (ELRI, 2017). 
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Ghana and Nigeria are partners in the West Africa Gas Pipeline Project, and have 
other collaborations regarding supply of oil and gas along the West African coastline.  
Ghana appears to have contemplated something in the regions of the NESREA in the 
Marine Pollution Act, 2016, in establishing the Office of the National Coordinator, and 
the National Contingency Plan.  However, Ghana’s Office of the National Coordinator 
seems to be rather inadequate, as by law, the Office is to coordinate the establishment 
and execution of a National Contingency Plan, instead of being a full agency 
responsible for protection of the marine environment with specific regard to 
exploitation activities. 
 
The NESREA has the task of ensuring compliance with various environmental laws 
which come under its mandate, with the following being specifically relevant to oil and 
gas exploitation: 
- Environmental Impact Assessment Act 
- The Land Use Act 
- Hydrocarbon Oil Refineries Act 
- Associated Gas Re-Injection Act 
- Oil Pipelines Act 
- Petroleum Act (ELRI, 2017). 
 
Specifically, the NESREA Act 2007 gives the mandate to the NESREA to regulate the 
Nigerian environment through 3 sections: 
- Section 7 provides the NESREA with the authority to ensure compliance with 
environmental laws, local and international, on environmental sanitation and 
pollution prevention and control through monitory and regulatory measures. 
- Section 8 (1) (k) empowers the Agency to make and review regulations on air 
and water quality, effluent limitations, control of harmful substances and other 
forms of environmental pollution and sanitation. 
- Section 27 prohibits, without lawful authority, the discharge of hazardous 
substances into the environment. 
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Since its inception, the NESREA is implementing existing regulations, and has also 
passed, through Parliament, regulations to enable them execute their mandate, 
including but not limited to: 
- National Effluent Limitation Regulations 
- National Environment Protection (Pollution Abatement and Industries and 
Facilities Producing Waste) Regulations, 1991 
- Federal Solid and Hazardous Waste Management Regulations 1991 
- Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) Act, CAP E12, LFN 2004 
- Land Use Act, CAP 202, LFN 2004 
- Harmful Waste (Special Criminal Provisions) Act, CAP H1, LFN 2004 
- Hydrocarbon Oil Refineries Act, CAP H5, LFN 2004 
- Oil in Navigable Waters Act, CAP 06, LFN 2004 
- Associated Gas Re-Injection Act, CAP 20, LFN 2004 
- Oil Pipelines Act, CAP 07, LFN 2004 
- Oil Pipelines Regulations 
- Petroleum Act, CAP P10, LFN 2004 
- Petroleum Drilling and Production Regulations 
- Petroleum Refining Regulations 
- Petroleum Products and Distribution Act, CAP 12, LFN 2004 
- Mineral Oil Safety Regulations and Crude Oil Transportation and Shipment 
Regulations 
- Environmental Sanitation Law 
- Environmental Pollution Control Law.  (ELRI, 2017) 
 
From the above, it can be seen that Nigeria has passed various Laws and Regulations 
to regulate the environment, including the marine environment, with specific regards 
to the exploration and exploitation of oil and gas, in the quest to prevent and control 
pollution of the environment, especially due to oil spillages.  This can be attributed to 
the fact that Nigeria has been drilling oil for quite a long time, and has thus had the 
opportunity to develop laws from their experiences, in order to forestall and combat 
environmental damage due to spillages. 
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Ghana, on the other hand, is a relatively new entrant on the oil and gas exploitation 
scene, having discovered oil in 2007 and begun commercial production in 2010.  
Before the discovery of oil in commercial quantities, the specific laws of Ghana which 
sought to control and regulate pollution of the marine environment were: 
- Ghana Maritime Security Act, 2004, Act 675 
- Ghana Shipping Act, 2003, Act 645 
- Environmental Protection Agency Act, 1994, Act 490 
- Oil in Navigable Waters Act, 1964, Act 235. 
 
These laws were mainly with regards to the transportation of oil through Ghanaian 
waters and in Ghanaian ports, and had little or no relevance to exploration and 
exploitation activities, though Ghana had been prospecting for oil since the GNPC 
was incorporated in the 1960’s.  These applicable laws were therefore inadequate to 
protect Ghana’s marine environment in the event of a spillage during exploitation 
activities for oil and gas. 
 
In order to upgrade the laws of Ghana with specific regards to exploration and 
exploitation of oil and gas in the advent of commercial drilling, the Ghana Maritime 
Authority, enjoined by law to see to the protection of Ghana’s waters, in 2010 
presented the Maritime Pollution Bill to Parliament for enactment.  After several 
reviews, the final Bill was presented to Parliament in October 2015 for enactment into 
law.  The Maritime Pollution Bill was “An Act to provide for the Prevention, Regulation 
and Control of Pollution within the Territorial waters of Ghana and other maritime 
zones under the control of Ghana, and for other related matters” (Maritime Pollution 
Act, 2016).  The Bill was finally passed into law in 2016, but is yet to receive 
presidential assent.  According to the former Deputy Minister of Transport, Mrs Joyce 
Bawa Mogtari, the Bill took a long time to pass because “It was initially based on the 
MARPOL, but had to be fine-tuned to include other necessary inputs at the request of 
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), (Mogtari, 2015). 
 
The Maritime Pollution Act is the most comprehensive Bill to date that incorporates 
most of the Marine Pollution Conventions ratified by Ghana, and is the only Act (Law) 
in Ghana that has a chapter on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and 
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Cooperation – Part 4, Chapter 8 (Maritime Pollution Act, 2016), as well as Liability 
and Compensation for Pollution Damage – Part 5, and specifically Liability for Oil 
Pollution – Part 5, Chapter 1.  It also incorporates the tenets of the London Convention 
1972, the International Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping 
of Wastes and Other Matter, 1972. 
 
The Maritime Pollution Act, 2016 also for the first time specifically rests the 
responsibility for the regulation of Ghana’s maritime domain in the Ghana Maritime 
Authority (GMA), but enjoins the Authority to collaborate with the EPA in the exercise 
of this mandate – Article 2 (1), (2), (Maritime Pollution Act, 2016).  Again, the Act 
creates a potential conflict between two governmental agencies in the regulation of 
Ghana’s maritime domain, and such potential conflicts are a common feature in 
Ghana’s laws, thereby creating a lag in ultimate responsibility amongst state 
institutions in the execution of their mandate. 
 
In fairness, however, for the implementation of the tenets of the Act, a specific 
provision is made for the Act to apply to “an offshore installation” – Article 1 (a) (iii), a 
new introduction to the laws regulating Ghana’s maritime domain.  The Act, in Article 
6, enjoins the GMA in collaboration with the EPA and other relevant agencies to, “in 
relation to maritime pollution activities within the purview of the IMO; 
(a) Directly or through the IMO, observe, measure, evaluate, and analyse by 
scientific methods recognised by the IMO the risks or effects of pollution of the 
marine environment; and 
(b) In particular keep under surveillance the effects of any activities which it 
permits or engages in for the purpose of determining whether these activities 
are likely to pollute the marine environment”. 
The Act therefore makes provision for the monitoring of offshore activities against 
pollution of the marine environment. 
 
Chapter 8 of the Act spells out the conditions for Oil Pollution Preparedness, 
Response and Cooperation.  Article 184 (2) enjoins “an operator of an offshore 
installation within the territorial waters or Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of Ghana 
to have an oil pollution emergency plan  
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(a) Coordinated with the system established … and  
(b) Approved in accordance with procedures established by the National 
Coordinator.”  (Maritime Pollution Act, 2016) 
 
Article 187 (1) establishes a “national system for the prompt and effective response 
to oil pollution incidents” (Maritime Pollution Act, 2016).  This is to ensure that 
spillages are promptly and effectively dealt with to minimise pollution, and Article 187 
(3) enjoins the National Coordinator to “prepare a national contingency plan for 
preparedness and response” (Maritime Pollution Act, 2016), in accordance with the 
tenets of the Contingency Planning Manual on Oil Pollution adopted by the IMO.  Sub 
section (4) of Article 187 requires that the National Coordinator also establishes, 
“either unilaterally or through bilateral or multilateral cooperation, and in cooperation 
with the oil and shipping industries, port authorities and other relevant entities;  
(a) A minimum level of pre-positioned oil spill combating equipment; 
(b) A programme of exercises for oil pollution response organisation and training 
of relevant personnel; 
(c) Detailed plans and communication capabilities … regarding an oil pollution 
incident; 
(d) Mechanisms and arrangements to coordinate response to an oil pollution 
incident” (Maritime Pollution Act, 2016). 
 
This chapter therefore clearly contemplates oil pollution incidents during actual 
exploitation, and attempts to safeguard the marine environment by prescribing 
preventive and combating measures in case of a spillage.  However, no specific 
responsibility is laid on the operators of the oil fields to prevent or forestall any such 
spillage, and they are also not held to strict combative measures to be put in place 
during exploitation activities. 
 
2.13 Regulatory Framework for Drilling Operations 
Nigeria, Ghana’s closest West African Neighbour with extensive operations in the 
exploitation of oil and gas, “operates a command and control regulatory framework in 
their oil and gas sector, which framework was prevalent in the United States and 
Britain during the 1970’s and 1980’s.  However, factors such as red tape, over-
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regulation and regulatory capture are some criticisms of this type of regime” (Ekhator, 
2016), and it is not surprising that so much pollution is prevalent in Nigeria’s waters 
and land, despite the command and control regime. 
 
For the environment to be protected from pollution due to actual drilling operations, 
there must be concrete measures put in place by the exploitation companies 
themselves on site to prevent and combat any spillage before they get out of hand.  
Experience has shown that a process-based pollution prevention method can work 
very well when implemented properly.  Such a process is “a framework to help a 
business identify pollution prevention opportunities, analyse their cost effectiveness, 
identify areas for improvement and develop action plans for implementation” (Oil 
Conservation Division, 2000).  It will also entail analysing what type of combating 
equipment to have on site, depending on the type of risk identified, in order to be most 
effective in combating a spillage, should it happen. 
 
Over the last 2 to 3 decades, emphasis has shifted from pollution control (waste 
management) to pollution prevention (waste minimisation) (Oil Conservation Division, 
2000).  Pollution prevention methods have been found to be most effective in 
forestalling environmental disasters, and more and more, companies are perfecting 
their systems and efforts at preventing pollution from their exploitation activities.  
Thus, more management commitment to processes of pollution prevention are 
advocated and practiced, and organisations have found this to be very effective in 
protecting the marine environment.  Organisations have developed their own systems 
approaches and incorporated them into the organisational plans so that they are 
implemented alongside normal organisational goals. 
 
Following the Macondo Well blowout on the Deepwater Horizon in April 2010, several 
reports have been produced after investigations from various organisations, including 
regulatory agencies, and among the recommendations from the Bureau of Safety and 
Environmental Enforcement was the following: 
- That “the responsible parties, including the lessee, operator and drilling 
contractor, be required to effectively manage all safety critical elements 
(SCE’s) – technical, operational and organisational – thereby ensuring their 
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effective operation and reducing major accident risk to As Low As Reasonably 
Practicable (ALARP)” (Final Report: Macondo Investigation Report, 2016) 
- This requirement includes “requirement for all responsible parties, including 
contractors, to conduct monitoring for continuous active assurance of all 
identified safety critical elements through each SCE’s lifecycle” (Final Report: 
Macondo Investigation Report, 2016) 
 
The American Petroleum Institute (API) also recommended, amongst others; 
- “development and implementation of a safety critical element (SCE) 
management system that includes the minimum necessary “shall” 
requirements in the standard, to establish and maintain effective safety 
barriers to prevent major accidents”, (Final Report: Macondo Investigation 
Report, 2016) 
- “methodologies for the identification of SCE’s and the development of 
performance standards of each SCE, including its functionality, availability, 
survivability and interactions with other systems”, (Final Report: Macondo 
Investigation Report, 2016). 
 
The Final Report on the Macondo Well blowout actually places the onus on the 
operators and contractors to ensure that preventive measures (e.g., BOPs) are in 
place on site, and are constantly monitored to ensure their operational effectiveness. 
 
The recommendations also prescribe combat readiness for accidental spillages at the 
drill sites, including the provision of containment booms and containment chambers, 
as well as chemical dispersants on site to combat spillages, though these are 
standard practice, but woefully inadequate in case of a blowout, as the effects of a 
blowout cannot be adequately predicted in order to provide adequate combative 
equipment.  Therefore, from all indications, preventive measures or a preventive 
system is the best method of protecting the environment from the debilitating effects 
of a spillage in actual drilling activities. 
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2.14 Legislating Drilling Operations in Ghana 
The Maritime Pollution Act, 2016 does not have any specific provisions requiring 
particular preventive or combative equipment of the drilling companies during actual 
drilling.  They are only required to cooperate with the National Coordinator in 
preparing the National Contingency Plan for preparedness and contingency.  Thus, 
the law does not place any onus on drilling companies with particular respect to 
containment booms, containment chambers, chemical dispersants or other such 
combating equipment.  Neither does the law place any onus on drilling companies 
with regards to testing or effectiveness of safety measures and equipment such as 
BOP’s, or even prescribe actual “safety drills” on site to ensure that all crew concerned 
know what to do and are able to effectively perform their various roles in the event of 
a spillage.  There is therefore the need to promulgate regulations to give effect to the 
Act when it receives presidential assent. 
 
The EPA, entrusted with the protection of Ghana’s environment against pollution, has 
in the meantime developed a National Oil Spill Contingency Plan, 2015, which seeks 
to address some of the gaps which the law does not specifically address with regards 
to actual drilling operations.  The Plan prescribes the role of the EPA as one of 
“coordination and provision of technical advice on logistics, maintenance, materials 
and equipment, and training”, and requires operators to “develop tactical oil spill 
contingency plans at their facilities” (EPA, 2016).  The Plan specifically identifies risks 
of marine pollution resulting from “collisions, stranding, blowouts and other marine 
accidents” (EPA, 2016) in Ghana’s waters subsequent to commencement of 
exploitation activities in the oil fields, and the deleterious and “disastrous effects such 
an incident could have on the ecological as well as socio-economic resources 
alongside the coastline of Ghana” (EPA, 2016). 
 
The Plan is therefore, in addition to other objectives, to “delineate responsibilities for 
the preparation and operational response to incidents, which could re result in spillage 
of oil into the marine, as well as coastal environment (EPA, 2016) of Ghana, and 
designates the EPA with the “overall responsibility to deal with any incident involving 
oil installations, oil pipelines or shipping” (EPA, 2016). 
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The Plan is intended to also “provide a framework for coordination of an integrated 
response to protect the marine environment from deleterious effects of pollution from 
spillages of oil substances” (EPA, 2016); and to “promote and ensure the 
development of local plans to prepare and respond to such incidents in accordance 
with best practices” (EPA, 2016). 
 
The Oil in Navigable Waters Act, 1964 failed to address the issue of marine pollution 
due to exploitation activities, thus the Maritime Pollution Act, 2016 seeks to address 
this anomaly.  Ghana does not have any other legislation relating to protection of the 
marine environment with regards to actual drilling; though the EPA Act 1994 enjoins 
the EPA to protect the environment of Ghana, it does not specifically address the 
issue of oil exploitation, and damage to the environment due to such exploitation. 
 
 
  
 45 
 
CHAPTER 3 
 
 
 
3.0 FINDINGS 
 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter looks at the findings from the administered questionnaires and interviews 
conducted1.  The chapter groups the research questions into 5 broad categories as 
mentioned earlier, and the analysis is made along these categories. 
 
3.2 Existence of Legal Regime in Ghana to Prevent/Combat a Spillage from 
Exploitation Activities 
 
3.2.1 The International Scene 
On the international scene, there is a paucity of Conventions/Protocols that relate 
particularly to prevention of pollution from exploitation activities, though much has 
been done with regards to prevention of pollution through transportation.  Although 
an attempt has been made through regional Conventions and Protocols like the 
Abidjan Convention, these look at prevention of pollution in general, thus pollution 
from exploitation activities have not been particularly catered for.  In a seeming 
attempt to address this shortfall, guidelines have been developed for the prevention 
and combat of spillages, from both transportation and exploitation activities.  These 
guidelines, however, do not have the force of legally binding conventions and 
protocols, and thus fall short of addressing the specific problem of pollution from 
exploitation activities. 
 
3.2.2 The Ghanaian Situation 
Respondents for this question were drawn from the GMA, EPA and the exploitation 
companies.  In order to answer this question, 3 criteria needed to be met for a positive 
conclusion to be drawn to the question.  They are: 
                                                          
1 Samples of the Questionnaire and Structured Interviews for the respondents are included in the 
research as Appendices 
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 Whether there was a law available or in place 
 Whether there was a designated institution to see to the implementation of the 
law 
 Whether the law was being implemented. 
 
Responses from the institutions polled are indicated in the tables and graphs below: 
 Table 1: Existence of a Law to Prevent/Combat an Oil Spill due to Exploitation Activities 
QUESTION ORGANISATION 
GMA EPA Exploitation Companies 
Is there a law in Ghana to 
prevent/combat an oil spill due 
to exploitation activities? 
 
Yes  
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Existence of a Law to Prevent/Combat an Oil Spill due to Exploitation Activities 
 
From the above responses, all the respondents agreed that there is indeed a legal 
regime to prevent/combat a spill due to exploitation activities. 
 
Table 2: Existence of Designated Institution to Implement the Law 
QUESTION ORGANISATION 
GMA EPA Exploitation Companies 
Is there a designated institution 
in Ghana to implement this law 
 
Yes  
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
100
100
100
Is There a Law on Spill Prevention/Combat
GMA
EPA
Exploitation Companies
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Figure 7: Existence of Designated Institution to Implement the Law 
Again, from the responses, all the institutions polled agreed that there was a 
designated institution to implement the law with regards to prevention and combat of 
a spillage due to exploitation activities. 
 
Table 3: Is the Law Being Implemented 
QUESTION ORGANISATION 
GMA EPA Exploitation Companies 
Is the law being implemented Yes  Yes Yes 
 
 
Figure 8: Implementation of the Law 
100
100
100
Designated Institution to Implement Law
GMA
EPA
Exploitation Companies
100
100
100
Implementation of Law on Spill 
Combat/Prevention
GMA
EPA
Exploitation Companies
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The institutions polled believe that the law on prevention and combat of a spillage due 
to exploitation activities was being implemented. 
 
From the responses received, the institutions polled believe that Ghana had a legal 
regime in place to prevent and/or combat a spillage should it occur during exploitation 
of oil from Ghana’s oil fields. 
 
3.3 Existence of Proactive Measures to Prevent and/or Combat a Spillage 
To find out whether proactive measures actually existed to prevent and/or combat a 
spillage should it occur during exploitation activities, the entire population of the 
selected organisations and institutions were polled.  These comprised the GMA, EPA, 
Exploitation Companies, Ghana Navy, GPHA and the RMU.  The RMU was added as 
they were the premier institution training local content to work in the oil fields, and 
would have to include in their training proactive measures to prevent and combat a 
spillage.  To answer this question, it was further sub-divided into the following criteria: 
 Whether there were proactive measures in place to prevent/combat a spillage 
 Whether the measures adhered to any laid down procedure 
 Whether the  stakeholders were trained in preventing/combating a spillage 
due to exploitation activities 
 Whether there was a Stipulated Plan to prevent/combat a spillage 
 Whether there was a designated Lead Organisation in prevention/combat of a 
spillage 
 Which organisation was the Lead Organisation responsible for 
prevention/combat of a spillage 
 Whether there are available equipment to stakeholder institutions to 
prevent/combat a spillage 
 Whether there were periodic drills on prevention/combat of a spillage 
 
The responses received from the respondents are indicated in the tables and graphs 
below: 
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Table 4:  Existence of Proactive Measures to Prevent/Combat a Spillage 
QUESTION ORGANISATION 
GMA EPA NAVY GPHA Exploitation 
Companies 
RMU 
Are there proactive 
measures to prevent 
or combat a spill? 
 
Yes  
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
 
Figure 9: Existence of Proactive Measures 
 
From the responses received on the above question, all the organisations agreed that 
there were indeed proactive measures to prevent and combat spillages in the oil fields 
in Ghana. 
 
Table 5:  Do Measures Adhere to Laid Down Procedure 
QUESTION ORGANISATION 
GMA 
(%) 
EPA 
(%) 
NAVY 
(%) 
GPHA 
(%) 
Exploitation 
Companies (%) 
RMU 
(%) 
Do the measures 
adhere to laid down 
procedure? 
 
30  
 
100 
 
14 
 
20 
 
100 
 
0 
 
100
100
100100
100
100
Existence of Prescribed Proactive Measures
GMA
EPA
RMU
GPHA
Navy
Exploitation Companies
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Figure 10: Do Measures Adhere to Laid Down Procedure 
From the responses received, only the EPA and Exploitation companies attest to the 
fact that the measures prescribed to prevent and combat a spillage adhere to laid 
down procedure.  The GMA indicated that the appropriate laid down procedure was 
yet to be backed by regulation, the Navy indicated that they had little or no knowledge 
of any laid down procedure, the RMU indicated that they were training students based 
on internationally recognised standards (OPITO), but not according to any standards 
set by local laws, the GPHA, as the major supplier to the oil fields, indicated that their 
procedure was based on industry standards.  The Exploitation companies, though 
agreeing that there was a laid down procedure prescribed for them by the EPA, 
indicated that they adhered to their own industry standard, which they believed was 
higher than that set for them by the EPA.  Based on the responses, it is difficult to 
conclude that all the stakeholders are on the same page with regards to measures 
and procedures for preventing and combating a spillage.  If indeed the EPA, which all 
agree is the implementing agency for the law on protecting the environment has such 
a procedure, it should be made standard for all the stakeholders, to ensure that they 
all adhere to the same procedure with regards to prevention and combating of a spill. 
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Table 6:  Are Stakeholders Trained in Preventing/Combating a Spillage 
QUESTION ORGANISATION 
GMA 
(%) 
EPA 
(%) 
NAVY 
(%) 
GPHA 
(%) 
Exploitation 
Companies (%) 
RMU 
(%) 
Are your staff trained 
in preventing and 
combating spills? 
 
0  
 
0 
 
57 
 
100 
 
100 
 
100 
 
 
Figure 11: Are Stakeholders Trained in Preventing/Combating a Spillage 
 
Respondents from the EPA and GMA indicated that their staff were not trained to 
prevent or combat a spill.  However, the GPHA agreed that their staff were trained, 
and 57% of respondents from the Ghana Navy indicated that they were so trained, 
whilst the RMU indicated that they were training their students as well in the 
prevention and combat of a spillage.  The exploitation companies all maintained that 
their staff were well trained in preventing and combating spills.  It must be noted here 
that the local residents also indicated that they had no knowledge of prevention or 
combat of a spillage, and no training or sensitisation had been given them in this 
regard as well.  This indicated that the regulatory agencies, as well as the Navy, which 
is primarily for security, are not trained in the prevention and combat of a spillage, but 
rather the exploitation companies and the service providers (GPHA) do have that 
training, because they deal directly with the exploiting of oil from the oil fields. 
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Table 7:  Existence of a Stipulated Prevention/Combat Plan for a Spill 
QUESTION ORGANISATION 
GMA 
(%) 
EPA 
(%) 
NAVY 
(%) 
GPHA 
(%) 
Exploitation 
Companies (%) 
RMU 
(%) 
Is there a stipulated 
Plan for preventing or 
combating a spill? 
 
100  
 
100 
 
42 
 
100 
 
100 
 
100 
 
 
Figure 12: Existence of a Stipulated Prevention/Combat Plan for a Spill 
 
42% of respondents from the Navy indicated that they were aware of an existing Spill 
Prevention and Control Plan, and the RMU indicated that they were indeed training 
their students according to a Plan on Oil Spill Prevention and Combat.  The other 
organisations indicated that indeed there was an existing plan to prevent oil spills at 
the exploitation sites, and to combat one if it should occur.  This Plan is the National 
Contingency Plan for Oil Spill Preparedness and Response, enshrined in the Maritime 
Pollution Act, 2016, which was to be established by the National Coordinator as part 
of the duties of that office. 
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Table 8:  Existence of a Designated Lead Organisation in Spill Prevention/Combat 
QUESTION ORGANISATION 
GMA 
(%) 
EPA 
(%) 
NAVY 
(%) 
GPHA 
(%) 
Exploitation 
Companies (%) 
RMU 
(%) 
Is there a designated 
organisation to lead or 
coordinate the 
prevention and 
combat of a spill? 
 
100  
 
100 
 
100 
 
100 
 
100 
 
100 
 
 
Figure 13: Existence of a Designated Lead Organisation for Spill Prevention and Combat 
 
Responses from all the organisations polled indicated that there was a designated 
Lead Organisation to coordinate activities for spill prevention and combat.  This is also 
in accordance with the tenets of the National Spill Response Plan. 
 
Table 9:  Designated Lead Organisation in Spill Prevention/Combat 
QUESTION ORGANISATION 
GMA 
(%) 
EPA 
(%) 
NAVY 
(%) 
GPHA 
(%) 
Exploitation 
Companies (%) 
RMU 
(%) 
What is the 
designated lead 
agency to coordinate 
the prevention and 
combat of a spill? 
 
17  
 
17 
 
66 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
100
100
100100
100
100
Existence of Designated Lead Organisation for 
Spill Prevention/Combat
GMA EPA GPHA RMU Navy Exploitation Companies
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Figure 14: Designated Lead Organisation for Spill Prevention and Combat 
 
17% of respondents indicated that the GMA was the Designated Lead Organisation 
for spill response, and 17% indicated it was the EPA, whilst 66% indicated it was the 
Ghana Navy.  However, in actual practice at various drills held, the Navy has been 
the lead organisation and on-scene commander.  This clearly indicates a conflict in 
organisational responsibility, and would not bode well for the country in an actual 
situation of an oil spill, as the lines of communication and authority are not clear cut, 
and may thus cause confusion and delays, to the detriment of the environment. 
 
Table 10:  Availability of Spill Prevention/Combat Equipment 
QUESTION ORGANISATION 
GMA 
(%) 
EPA 
(%) 
NAVY 
(%) 
GPHA 
(%) 
Exploitation Companies 
(%) 
Do you have the 
equipment to prevent 
or combat a spill? 
 
0  
 
0 
 
0 
 
100 
 
100  
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Figure 15: Availability of Spill Prevention/Combat Equipment 
 
The responses indicate that none of the regulatory agencies have any equipment for 
prevention or combating of a spill.  Only the exploitation companies, and the GPHA 
as a service organisation for the oil industry, have the equipment to prevent and 
combat a spill should one occur.  However, responses from both organisations 
indicate that they have standard equipment with regards to the industry, including 
booms, skimmers, isolation chambers and chemical dispersants.  The exploitation 
companies also indicated that they perform monthly checks on their Blow Out 
Preventers (BOPs) and semi-annual full maintenance checks on them. 
 
Table 11:  Organisation of Periodic Drills on Prevention/Combat of a Spill 
QUESTION ORGANISATION 
GMA  EPA  NAVY  GPHA  Exploitation Companies  
Are there periodic 
drills on prevention 
and combat of a spill? 
 
Yes  
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes  
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Figure 16: Organisation of Periodic Drills on Prevention/Combat of a Spill 
 
All the organisations polled stated that there was an annual drill on Spill Prevention 
and Combat, which was coordinated by the Navy, as the on-scene commander.  In 
addition, the exploitation companies stated that they held semi-annual joint drills on 
their own, as the exploitation companies, in order to be able to prevent, detect and 
combat a spill to prevent environmental damage. 
 
3.4 Existence of National Provision to Engage International Aid in Spill 
Combat 
To ascertain the veracity or otherwise of this statement, questions were asked of 4 
organisations – the GMA, the EPA, the Navy and the Exploitation Companies.  To 
answer this question, it was further sub-divided into the following criteria in the 
questionnaire: 
 Whether there was national regulation to engage foreign aid in spill combat 
 Whether there was any protocol to engage such foreign aid in spill combat 
 Whether there was any existing contract/protocol with any particular entity for 
aid in spill combat 
 How long it would take for such foreign aid to be activated 
 
Responses received to these questions are summarised in the tables and graphs 
below: 
100
100
100
100
100
Periodic Prevention/Combat Drills
GMA
EPA
GPHA
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Exploitation Companies
 57 
 
Table 12:  Existence of national regulation to call in foreign aid in spill combat 
QUESTION ORGANISATION 
Is there national regulation to call for 
foreign assistance in preventing and/or 
combating a spill 
GMA EPA NAVY Exploitation 
Companies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
 
Figure 17: Existence of national regulation to solicit foreign aid in spill combat 
 
All responding organisations indicated that there indeed existed national regulation to 
solicit foreign assistance in preventing and/or combating a spill. 
 
Table 13:  Existence of Protocol to solicit foreign aid in spill combat 
QUESTION ORGANISATION 
Is there any protocol for soliciting foreign 
assistance in preventing and/or 
combating a spill 
GMA EPA NAVY Exploitation 
Companies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
100
100100
100
Existing Regulation for Foreign 
Assistance
GMA
EPA
Navy
Exploitation Companies
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Figure 18: Existence of protocol to solicit foreign aid in spill combat 
 
All responding organisations indicated that there were national protocols to solicit 
foreign assistance in preventing and/or combating a spill.  They explained that Ghana 
was a signatory to the Abidjan Convention, and also the United Nations Environment 
Programme, which both sought to protect the marine environment against pollution, 
and thus the country could call in foreign assistance when needed. 
 
Table 14:  Existence of Contract for assistance in spill combat 
QUESTION ORGANISATION 
Is there any existing contract in 
preventing and/or combating a spill 
GMA EPA NAVY Exploitation 
Companies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
 
100
100100
100
Existing Protocol to solicit foreign 
assistance
GMA
EPA
Navy
Exploitation Companies
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Figure 19: Existence of contract foreign assistance in spill combat 
 
All the respondents polled indicated that there was an existing contract/agreement 
with Oil Services Response Ltd for the combat of a spillage, should it occur.  In 
addition, the exploitation companies indicated that they variously had agreements 
with West African Oil Spill Network, and the International Oil Spill Organisation in the 
UK, for assistance in the event of a spill which was above their capacity to handle. 
 
Table 15:  How long would it take for such foreign aid to be activated? 
QUESTION ORGANISATION 
How much time would it take for such 
foreign aid in combating a spill to be 
activated? 
GMA 
(Hrs) 
EPA 
(Hrs) 
NAVY 
(Hrs) 
Exploitation 
Companies 
(Hrs) 
24 24 24 12 
 
100
100100
100
Existence of Contract for Spill Combat 
Assistance
GMA
EPA
Navy
Exploitation Companies
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Figure 20: How long it would take to activate foreign assistance in spill combat 
 
Responses from the regulatory agencies showed that it would take 24 hours to 
engage foreign assistance in combating a spill, whilst the exploitation companies 
indicated that they would take 12 hours to call in assistance when needed. 
 
3.5 Existence of Compensatory Regime for a Spillage, and Existence of 
Specific Responsibility/Sanctions for such Regime 
Questions on this statement sought to find out whether there was a regulatory regime 
for compensation in case of an oil spill, and if so, which organisation would see to the 
implementation of this regime.  They also sought to find out whether the law placed 
specific responsibility on any organisation to effect the compensation, and/or 
prescribed any sanctions for such organisation should they fail to effect 
compensation.  Respondents were drawn from the GMA and the EPA, as regulatory 
agencies.  The questions were categorised into: 
 Whether there was a regulation to exact compensation for oil pollution 
damage; 
 Whether there was a designated institution to implement such a regulation; 
 Whether the regulation identified any specific organisation responsible for 
paying such compensation; 
 Whether any sanctions were prescribed for defaulting organisations. 
24
24
24
12
Time Lag to Engage Assistance in Spill 
Combat (Hrs)
GMA
EPA
Navy
Exploitation Companies
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Responses to these questions were all in the affirmative.  The responses indicated 
that the law designated the GMA as the agency to implement the compensatory 
regime set out by law, and the regulations spelt out clearly a “polluter pays” policy, 
i.e., that the company identified as being responsible for the pollution would be held 
responsible for paying any compensation determined by the law.  Again, the GMA 
could exact administrative sanctions on any organisation identified which failed to 
effect the compensation, which sanctions included preventing such companies from 
operating until all compensation issues had been resolved, or even revoking their 
operating licence. 
 
3.6 Incorporation of Local Conditions and Population in Spill Prevention, 
Combat and Compensation Regime 
This question sought to find out whether local conditions, including currents, tides and 
flow patterns had been factored into any prevention and combat preparations 
established in the oil fields.  Responses from the regulatory agencies, the Navy and 
the exploitation companies indicated that indeed, this was standard practice, and the 
RMU also indicated that they included this in their training of local content, as it was 
standard procedure to factor in local conditions in the prevention and combat of a 
spillage. 
 
However, all the respondents indicated that the local population had not been involved 
in any preventive or combat measures, and indeed they were prevented from 
engaging in any activities in or near the oil fields, as their activities might be potential 
hazards and cause pollution incidents. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
 
 
4.0 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
4.1 Conclusions 
SDG 14 of the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDG’s) adopted in 
September 2015 is on “Life Below Water” and aims at laying the foundation for the 
integrated and sustainable management of the oceans (Cornier & Elliot, 2017), in 
order to “meet the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future 
generations to meet their own needs” (Kates, Parris and Leiserowitz, 2016).  Crude 
oil is a big pollutant, especially of the marine environment, and it is not surprising 
therefore that the IMO has placed emphasis on protection of the marine environment 
from pollution by crude oil.  However, this emphasis has mainly been on the 
transportation of the crude, and there is little or no international regulation regarding 
the exploitation of the crude, and the pollution it can cause. 
 
Ghana, as a relatively new entrant on the crude oil exploitation scene, is thus 
constrained in implementing laws which would protect its marine environment with 
specific regard to exploitation activities, as this has over the years in other 
jurisdictions, mainly been left to local legislation to regulate, and more often than not, 
has been regulated through learning from rather avoidable experiences.  It is in this 
light that Ghana in 2016 passed the Maritime Pollution Act, 2016, which seeks to 
regulate somewhat exploitation of Ghana’s marine resources with specific regard to 
pollution of the marine environment.  In an attempt to reduce marine pollution to the 
barest minimum, the Marine Pollution Act, 2016 establishes the National Coordinator 
and a National Contingency Plan to combat a spill at the earliest possible time, but 
implementation of this Plan has come with its own problems. 
 
Though Ghana had the Oil in Navigable Waters Act, 1964, this was obviously not 
adequate in the wake of oil discovery, and some review/amendments of this Act is 
found in the Marine Pollution Act, 2016.  Ghana, however, has to pass an act 
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specifically regulating the exploitation of its marine resources, such as has been done 
in Nigeria with the NESREA Act, which effectively consolidated all the laws relating to 
the protection of the environment, especially with regards to exploitation of oil.  This 
thus puts forward a compelling argument for a review of the EPA Act, 1994, which 
can consolidate the environmental laws without having to go through the process of 
passing a whole new law on the environment. 
 
With the promulgation of the Maritime Pollution Act, 2016, implementation should be 
vested in the ambit of one institution, as the Act itself establishes the office of the 
National Coordinator.  In the absence of clear and concise lines of authority and 
responsibility, it has fallen to the Ghana Navy to coordinate activities with regards to 
spill combating.  This has the tendency of creating a lethargic attitude amongst the 
other regulatory agencies, as they may feel that their authority is being usurped.  
Again, these institutions are not resourced in spill combating, and the Navy is also 
under-resourced, such that they have to fall on the oil exploitation companies to 
provide said resources to combat a spill.  This is not in the best interest of the country, 
as the companies are profit oriented, and would only provide the barest equipment 
required to comply with the law which granted them the licence to exploit the marine 
resources. 
 
Ghana has some bilateral agreements on spill combat, including agreement with the 
Oil Spill Response Ltd (OSRL) and the United Nations Environment Programme 
(UNEP), and is also signatory to the Abidjan Convention, so can safely rely on 
international aid to combat a spill, but again, the time lapse before such aid can be 
called in is wide enough for any accidental spill to get out of control.  Another issue of 
concern is the “polluter pays” principle on issues of compensation for oil pollution 
damage, as it might take some time for such polluter to mobilise resources to effect 
the compensation, which might not be good for the country, especially where 
international assistance in combating a spill is involved. 
 
Finally, it is important to point out that though an attempt has been made to regulate 
the oil extraction industry with regards to pollution of the marine environment, Ghana 
is not well placed to combat a spill of enormous proportions such as one caused by a 
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blowout, and such a spill can cause grave environmental damage before it can be 
brought under control, if the current regime is left as it is. 
 
4.2 Recommendations 
In order to place Ghana on good footing with regards to prevention and combat of a 
spillage due to exploitation activities, the following recommendations are proffered: 
 Review/Amend the EPA Act, 1994 to consolidate all environmental protection 
laws, taking into particular consideration the advent of commercial production 
of oil. 
 Review the compensation regime currently in place to have a permanent fund 
to cater for compensation in cases of oil pollution damage. 
 Clearly define lines of authority and responsibility for the organisation 
responsible for coordinating and leading any spill response, as enshrined in 
the National Contingency Plan, and circulate same to all stakeholder 
institutions, in order to have unity of command and responsibility in the event 
of a spill. 
 Train, resource and equip the EPA to have permanent representatives at the 
exploitation sites, to also conduct independent monitoring of activities, and to 
have a first-hand report of any spills or potential hazards to the marine 
environment. 
 Sensitise the local communities around the exploitation sites on the dangers 
of their fishing activities at the drill sites, in order to get their cooperation on 
the restriction of those areas, so as to free the Navy from the daily 
responsibility of keeping the fishermen away. 
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APPENDICES 
 
APPENDIX 1 
QUESTIONNAIRE/STRUCTURED INTERVIEW FOR THE GHANA MARITIME 
AUTHORITY 
 
1. Ghana’s Parliament has passed the Maritime Pollution Bill in 2016, but it has 
not yet received Presidential Assent.  Does the Ghana Maritime Authority 
(GMA) have the mandate of executing the tenets of this Bill once it receives 
Presidential Assent?  Yes/No 
2. If YES to (1) above, does the mandate include prevention and combating of 
oil pollution in Ghana’s oil fields?  Yes/No 
3. Apart from the GMA, which other organisations have the mandate of ensuring 
prevention and combat of oil spills at the oil fields? 
4. Does the GMA have any collaboration with these organisations with regards 
to preventing and combating an oil spill at the oil fields?  Yes/No 
5. Which organisation would play the lead role in the prevention of an oil spill at 
the oil fields? 
6. Which organization would play the lead role in the combat of an oil spill at the 
oil fields, should one occur? 
7. Does the GMA play any regulatory role regarding the operators at the oil 
fields?  Yes/No 
8. If YES to (7) above, what role? 
9. Can the GMA enforce preventive measures towards an oil spill with regards 
to the operators at the oil fields?  Yes/No 
10. If YES to (9) above, in what way? 
11. Can the GMA enforce combative measures in the event of an oil spill at the oil 
fields?  Yes/No 
12. If YES to (11) above, in what way? 
13. Is the GMA required to have on-site inspectors at the oil fields towards the 
prevention of an oil spill?  Yes/No 
14. If YES to (13) above, does the GMA have these inspectors on site?  Yes/No 
15. Does the GMA have any standby equipment to prevent/combat an oil spill at 
the oil fields?  Yes/No 
16. If YES to (15) above, to what level are these equipment adequate (as 
described by the Maritime Pollution Bill)? 
Level 1                          Level 2                                Level 3 
 
17. Does the GMA have the mandate to prescribe which preventive/combative 
measures need to be put in place by the operators in the oil fields?  Yes/No 
18. Can the GMA call in foreign aid to help combat an oil spill should it occur at 
the oil fields?  Yes/No 
19. If YES to (18) above, who will be responsible for compensating such foreign 
aid called in to help combat a spillage should one occur? 
20. Can the GMA sanction operating companies in the oil fields in the event of an 
oil spillage?  Yes/No 
21. Is the GMA involved in educating the local population near the oil fields on oil 
pollution prevention?  Yes/No 
 70 
 
22. If YES to (21) above, has any education taken place on pollution prevention 
since the commencement of commercial exploitation at the oil fields?  Yes/No 
23. Is the GMA involved in educating the local population near the oil fields on oil 
pollution combating?  Yes/No 
24. If YES to (23) above, has any education taken place on combating of oil 
pollution amongst the local population since the commencement of 
commercial drilling?  Yes/No 
25. Would the GMA be involved in the calculation of any compensation to be paid 
in the event of a spillage at the oil fields?  Yes/No 
26. If YES to (25) above, does the GMA have the mandate to enforce any such 
awards according to law?  Yes/No 
27. The Maritime Pollution Bill stipulates the establishment of a National 
Coordinator to “Prepare a National Contingency Plan for preparedness and 
response” in case of an oil spill.  Has this National Coordinator been 
established?  Yes/No 
28. If YES to (27) above, has a National Contingency Plan been prepared, as 
stipulated by the Bill?  Yes/No 
29. If NO to (27) above, how soon is the National Coordinator expected to be set 
up? 
30. If NO to (28) above, how soon is the National Contingency Plan expected to 
be set up? 
31. Is there any other information you can give regarding the GMA’s involvement 
in the prevention and combat of an oil spill at Ghana’s oil fields? 
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APPENDIX 2 
QUESTIONNAIRE/STRUCTURED INTERVIEW FOR THE ENVIRONMENTAL 
PROTECTION AGENCY 
 
1. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Act, Act 490, was passed in 
1994.  Has the EPA considered any revisions/amendments to the Act?  
Yes/No 
2. If YES to (1) above, have any revisions/amendments been presented to 
Parliament, especially in the wake of commencement of commercial 
exploitation of oil and gas in Ghana?  Yes/No 
3. Has the EPA proposed any revisions/amendments to the Oil in Navigable 
Waters Act, Act 235 of 1964, especially in the wake of commercial exploitation 
of oil and gas in Ghana?  Yes/No 
4. If YES to (3) above, have these revisions/amendments been presented to 
Parliament?  Yes/No 
5. If NO to (3) above, is the EPA considering proposing any 
revisions/amendments to the Oil in Navigable Waters Act, Act 235 of 1964?  
Yes/No 
6. Has the EPA set any standards to be complied with by the exploitation 
companies in the wake of oil and gas discovery in Ghanaian waters?  Yes/No 
7. If YES to (6) above, are these standards spelt out in the Environmental Impact 
Assessment of the operators in Ghana’s oil fields?  Yes/No 
8. If YES to (6) above, does the EPA have the logistics to monitor adherence to 
these set standards?  Yes/No 
9. If YES to (6) above, does the EPA have the personnel to monitor adherence 
to these set standards?  Yes/No 
10. If YES to (6) above, are there any prescribed measures to be undertaken in 
the event of non-compliance with these set standards?  Yes/No 
11. If YES to (6) above, does the EPA have the mandate to prevent the 
exploitation companies from operating, in case they do not comply with these 
set standards?  Yes/No 
12. Does the EPA have any prescribed pollution prevention measures in place to 
be complied with by the exploitation companies in Ghana’s oil fields?  Yes/No 
13. If YES to (12) above, does the EPA have the mandate to halt the exploitation 
activities of these companies in the event of non-compliance with these 
measures?  Yes/No 
14. Can the EPA demand immediate curtailing of exploitation activities on the 
discovery of an environmental threat due to pollution from the exploitation 
activities?  Yes/No 
15. Does the EPA have the mandate to request combating of a spillage at the oil 
fields from the exploitation companies in case of such a spill?  Yes/No 
16. Does the EPA have the mandate to prescribe specific pollution combat 
measures/equipment for the exploitation companies?  Yes/No 
17. Is the EPA directly involved in environmental pollution prevention at the oil 
fields, e.g., in operational procedures?  Yes/No 
18. Is the EPA directly involved in combating a spill to prevent environmental 
pollution should it occur at the oil fields?  Yes/No 
19. Does the EPA have the requisite equipment and technical know-how in 
combating an oil spill at the oil fields, should one occur?  Yes/No 
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20. Is the EPA involved in securing foreign aid to help combat an environmental 
disaster, should a spillage occur at the oil fields?  Yes/No 
21. If YES to (20) above, in what way? 
22. Is the EPA directly involved in any compensatory regime in the event of an oil 
spill at the oil fields, should one occur?  Yes/No 
23. If YES to (22) above, in what way? 
24. Is the EPA directly involved in any other way with regards to prevention and 
combating of a spillage at the oil fields?  Yes/No 
25. If YES to (24) above, in what way? 
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APPENDIX 3 
QUESTIONNAIRE FOR THE GHANA NAVY 
 
1. Is the Ghana Navy directly involved in the provision of security at the oil fields 
offshore Ghana?  Yes/No 
2. Is the Ghana Navy well equipped in the provision of security at the oil fields 
offshore Ghana?  Yes/No 
3. Is the Ghana Navy directly involved in the provision of preventive measures in 
case of an oil spill at the oil fields?  Yes/No 
4. If YES to question (3) above, in what way? 
5. If YES to question (3) above, is the Ghana Navy well equipped for the 
prevention of an oil spill at the oil fields?  Yes/No 
6. If YES to question (5) above, are the equipment specific to local conditions 
with regards to preventing an oil spill?  Yes/No 
7. Is the Ghana Navy technically prepared in the prevention of an oil spill at the 
oil fields?  Yes/No 
8. Are personnel of the Ghana Navy permanently stationed at the oil fields in the 
provision of security?  Yes/No 
9. If YES to question (8) above, are the personnel of the Ghana Navy trained in 
the prevention of oil spills?  Yes/No 
10. Does the Ghana Navy have any laid down procedure incorporated into 
standard operations at the oil fields with respect to prevention of an oil spill?  
Yes/No 
11. Does the Ghana Navy have the legal mandate to stop production activities in 
case of a spillage at the oil fields?  Yes/No 
12. Is the Ghana Navy directly involved in the combat of an oil spill at the oil fields, 
should it occur?  Yes/No 
13. If YES to question (12) above, in what way? 
14. Is the Ghana Navy well trained in combating oil spills?  Yes/No 
15. Does the Ghana Navy have the resources to help combat an oil spill should it 
occur at the oil fields?  Yes/No 
16. Can the Ghana Navy call on other security services to help combat an oil spill 
should it occur at the oil fields?  Yes/No 
17. Can the Ghana Navy call on other nations in the sub-region to help combat a 
spillage, should it occur in the oil fields?  Yes/No 
18. If YES to question (17) above, are there any protocols to this effect?  Yes/No 
19. If YES to question (17) above, how much time may elapse before a response 
is received?  12 hrs.                   24 hrs.               48 hrs.                72 hrs.      
 
20. Is there any other information you may give regarding the Ghana Navy’s 
involvement in prevention and combat of an oil spill at the oil fields? 
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APPENDIX 4 
QUESTIONNAIRE FOR THE GHANA PORTS & HARBOURS AUTHORITY 
 
1. Is the Ghana Ports & Harbours Authority (GPHA) a premier provider of 
services to companies directly involved in exploitation activities in Ghana’s oil 
fields?  Yes/No 
2. Has the GPHA factored into its operations the real possibility of an oil spill in 
Ghana’s oil fields?  Yes/No 
3. Is the GPHA directly involved in prevention of an oil spill in Ghana’s waters?  
Yes/No 
4. If YES to (3) above, in what capacity? 
5. Does the GPHA have the technical and logistic capacity to help combat an oil 
spill should one occur in Ghana’s oil fields?  Yes/No 
6. Is the GPHA involved in drills towards the combat of an oil spill in Ghana’s oil 
fields?  Yes/No 
7. Does the GPHA have an Oil Spill Contingency Plan as spelt out in the 
Contingency Planning Manual on Oil Pollution adopted by the International 
Maritime Organisation?  Yes/No 
8. Are there any specific materials prescribed for mitigating or containing an oil 
spill during drilling operations?  Yes/No 
9. If YES to (8) above, is the GPHA involved in the procurement and provision of 
these materials?  Yes/No 
10. Does the GPHA have the technical capacity to prevent and/or combat an oil 
spill should one occur in Ghana’s oil fields?  Yes/No 
11. In which other way is the GPHA involved in the prevention and combat of an 
oil spill in Ghana’s oil fields? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 75 
 
APPENDIX 5 
QUESTIONNAIRE FOR THE REGIONAL MARITIME UNIVERSITY 
 
1. The Regional Maritime University (RMU) is the premier training institution for 
training local content for Ghana’s offshore industry.  Is Basic Offshore Safety 
Induction and Emergency Training (BOSIET) / Tropical Basic Offshore Safety 
Induction and Emergency Training (TBOSIET) part of the standard training 
offered to students?  Yes/No 
2. If YES to (1) above, is BOSIET/TBOSIET training offered to all students for 
the offshore industry or to only those specifically involved in drilling activities? 
3. If YES to (1) above, is the BOSIET/TBOSIET training available for personnel 
already working in the offshore industry?  Yes/No 
4. If YES to (1) above, does the BOSIET/TBOSIET training standards conform 
to those set by the Offshore Petroleum Industry Training Organisation 
(OPITO)?  Yes/No 
5. If NO to (4) above, to which international standards does the RMU’s 
BOSIET/TBOSIET training conform? 
6. Does the RMU offer re-validation courses for BOSIET/TBOSIET Certificates?  
Yes/No 
7. If YES to (6) above, after how many years from the issuance of the last 
BOSIET/TBOSIET are trainees required to re-validate their Certificates? 
8. Does the RMU offer Further Offshore Emergency Training (FOET) / Tropical 
Further Offshore Emergency Training (TFOET) training for personnel working 
in Ghana’s offshore industry?  Yes/No 
9. If YES to (8) above, does the FOET/TFOET standards offered by the RMU 
conform to OPITO set standards?  Yes/No 
10. If NO to (9) above, to which international standards do the RMU’s 
FOET/TFOET training conform? 
11. Does the offshore emergency training courses offered by the RMU include 
prevention of spillages of oil at the oil fields?  Yes/No 
12. Does the offshore emergency training courses offered by the RMU include 
combat of spillages of oil at the oil fields?  Yes/No 
13. Does the RMU’s training require trainees to have a Minimum Industry 
Standard Training (MIST) Certificate?  Yes/No 
14. Does the RMU offer MIST courses for trainees?  Yes/No 
15. If YES to (14) above, does the RMU’s MIST course conform to OPITO set 
standards?  Yes/No 
16. If NO to (15) above, to which standards does the RMU’s MIST courses 
conform? 
17. If YES to (14) above, does the RMU’s MIST course conform to local 
conditions?  Yes/No 
18. Does the RMU offer any other internationally recognized courses for offshore 
training geared towards prevention and combat of an oil spill?  Yes/No 
19. If YES to (18) above, which courses are these? 
20. Is there any further information you can give us regarding training of personnel 
for the offshore industry towards prevention and combat of oil spills in Ghana’s 
offshore industry? 
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APPENDIX 6 
QUESTIONNAIRE/STRUCTURED INTERVIEW FOR THE OIL FIELD OPERATORS 
 
Name of Company:  ………………………………………………………………………… 
 
1. International Conventions prescribe the protection of the marine environment 
by all users of the maritime domain.  As a potential contributor to degradation 
of the marine environment in Ghana’s oil fields, is your company well placed 
with regards to protection of the marine environment due to pollution 
emanating from your activities?  Yes/No 
2. Has your company considered the possibility of a spillage during your 
operations, e.g., a blowout?  Yes/No 
3. Do you have active measures in place to prevent pollution of the marine 
environment due to your activities?  Yes/No 
4. If YES to (3) above, which measures do you have in place? 
5. If YES to (3) above, were these measures prescribed by law or they are your 
normal operating procedures? 
6. Do you have Blow Out Preventers (BOPs) on all your well heads to prevent 
potential damage to the marine environment?  Yes/No 
7. If YES to (6) above, how often are the BOPs checked for possible malfunction? 
8. Do you have active measures in place to combat a spillage should one occur 
due to your operations?  Yes/No 
9. If YES to (8) above, which measures do you have in place? 
10. Do you have booms on site to contain a spillage should one occur due to your 
operations?  Yes/No 
11. If YES to (10) above, how wide an area can your booms cover? 
12. Do you have a containment chamber(s) on site to help contain an oil spillage 
should one occur due to your operations?  Yes/No 
13. If YES to (12) above, how much oil/pollutant can the chamber(s) contain? 
14. Do you have dispersants on site to help mitigate the effects of an oil spill 
should one occur due to your operations?  Yes/No 
15. If YES to (14) above, how often are they checked/changed? 
16. Do you have any other oil spill combating materials on site to mitigate the 
effects of a spill during your operations, should one occur?  Yes/No 
17. If YES to (16) above, what are they? 
18. Does your company regularly perform oil spill emergency drills?  Yes/No 
19. If YES to (18) above, how often? 
20. Does your company have an Oil Spill Contingency Plan/Procedure as set out 
by the Manual on Oil Spill Contingency Planning of the International Maritime 
Organisation (IMO)?  Yes/No 
21. If YES to (20) above, are your staff well versed in the Plan? 
22. Does your company have any relationship with international organisations to 
be able to call for help in combating a spillage should one occur due to your 
operations?  Yes/No 
23. If YES to (22) above, which organisations are these? 
24. If YES to (22) above, how soon can your company expect a response from 
these organisations: 
12 hours            24 hours           36 hours           48 hours           72 hours 
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25. Does your company collaborate with other operators in the oil fields towards 
oil spill preparedness and combat?  Yes/No 
26. Does your company have joint oil spill emergency drills with other operators in 
the oil fields?  Yes/No 
27. If YES to (26) above, how often? 
28. Has your company identified any natural collection sites to use in case of a 
spillage due to your operations?  Yes/No 
29. Does your company have a log of currents and flow patterns in the oil fields 
where you operate?  Yes/No 
30. Does your company have a log of estimated currents and deflection angles in 
the oil fields where you operate?  Yes/No 
31. Has your company identified any tidal considerations to be factored into your 
operations in the event of an oil spill due to your operations?  Yes/No 
32. Is your company well placed to use double barrier technique in the event of an 
oil spill due to your operations?  Yes/No 
33. Is your company well placed to use deflection booming in the event of an oil 
spill due to your operations?  Yes/No 
34. Does your company have stand-by boats for debris collection, boom 
deployment?  Yes/No 
35. Does your company have shore sealing booms, in case of an oil spill due to 
your operations?  Yes/No 
36. Does your company have a pre-spill Plan as part of your Standard Operating 
Procedures?  Yes/No 
37. If YES to (36) above, is this pre-spill Plan integrated into your Oil Spill 
Contingency Plan?  Yes/No 
38. Does your company have any funding mechanism set aside to respond to an 
oil spill, should one happen due to your operations?  Yes/No 
39. Does your company engage your staff in periodic pre-spill training and 
simulation, e.g., BOSIET?  Yes/No 
40. Has your company identified any high risk areas in your field of operations?  
Yes/No 
41. Does your company have the ability to assess any environmental damage that 
may happen due to your operations?  Yes/No 
42. Does your company have the ability for restoration after decommission of your 
wells?  Yes/No 
43. Is your company able to effect compensation for any environmental damage 
due to an oil spill as a result of your operations? 
44. What other preparations has your company made towards the 
prevention/combat of an oil spill should one occur due to your operations? 
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APPENDIX 7 
STRUCTURED INTERVIEW FOR THE LOCAL POPULATION 
 
1. Are you aware of the on-going drilling activities in the waters off your coast?  
Yes/No 
2. If YES to (1) above, how did you get to know? 
- I heard it on the news 
- I saw them when I went fishing 
- I was told by the drilling companies 
- I was told by a Government representative (Assembly member, DCE) 
- Other (Please specify) 
3. Has the drilling activities off your coast in any way affected your daily life?  
Yes/No 
4. If YES to (3) above, in what way? 
- It has limited our fishing grounds 
- It makes us go further to get any catch 
- We are not allowed to fish in the area 
- We are not allowed to use outboard motors in the area 
- Other (Please specify) 
5. Has any compensation been paid to your community for the disruption of your 
livelihood?  Yes/No 
6. If YES to (5) above, by whom? 
- By the drilling companies 
- By a local Government representative (Assembly member, DCE) 
- By Government employees from Accra 
- By the Ghana Ports & Harbours Authority (GPHA) 
- Other (Please specify) 
7. Has any sensitization been conducted in your community on what to do to 
prevent accidents at the oil fields?  Yes/No 
8. If YES to (7) above, by whom? 
- By the drilling companies 
- By a local Government representative (Assembly member, DCE) 
- By Government employees from Accra 
- By the Ghana Ports & Harbours Authority (GPHA) 
- Other (Please specify) 
9. Does regular sensitization on how to prevent an accident at the oil fields take 
place in your community?  Yes/No 
10. If YES to (9) above, how regularly? 
- Once a year 
- Twice in a year 
- Three times in a year 
- Once every quarter 
- Other (Please specify) 
11. If YES to (9) above, by whom? 
- By the drilling companies 
- By a local Government representative (Assembly member, DCE) 
- By Government employees from Accra 
- By the Ghana Ports & Harbours Authority (GPHA) 
- Other (Please specify) 
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12. Has any sensitization been conducted in your community on how to combat a 
spillage should one occur?  Yes/No 
13. If YES to (12) above, by whom? 
- By the drilling companies 
- By a local Government representative (Assembly member, DCE) 
- By Government employees from Accra 
- By the Ghana Ports & Harbours Authority (GPHA) 
- Other (Please specify) 
14. If NO to (12) above, are you aware of how to combat a spillage of oil should 
one occur at the oil fields?  Yes/No 
15. If YES to (14) above, how did you know? 
- Folklore passed down from generation to generation 
- Past experience 
- Cultural practices of our area 
- Other (Please specify) 
16. Does regular sensitization on how to combat a spillage should one occur in 
the oil fields take place in your community?  Yes/No 
17. If YES to (16) above, by whom? 
- By the drilling companies 
- By a local Government representative (Assembly member, DCE) 
- By Government employees from Accra 
- By the Ghana Ports & Harbours Authority (GPHA) 
- Other (Please specify) 
18. Has any spillage occurred in your community since the commencement of 
drilling activities?  Yes/No 
19. If YES to (18) above, was it combated?  Yes/No 
20. If YES to (19) above, by whom? 
- By the drilling companies 
- By Government employees from Accra 
- By the Ghana Ports & Harbours Authority (GPHA) 
- By ourselves (local community) 
- Other (Please specify) 
21. If YES to 18 above, was any compensation paid to your community for the 
spillage?  Yes/No 
22. Do you feel capable enough to help combat a spillage should one occur at the 
oil fields?  Yes/No 
23. Is there any other information you can give us with regards to combating an 
oil spill at the oil fields? 
 
 
